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Summary findings
Evidence to support or deny expectations of future  model results show 26 countries with statistically
scarcity  or  abundance  of crude  oil must  show  whether  significant  shifts  in supply  functions  - in almost  equal
crude  oil supply  functions  are  shifting  and,  if so, in what  parts  expansionary  and  contractionary.
direction.  Watkins  and Streifel  estimate  oil supply  The  shift is often  contractionary  in countries  with  a
functions  for  41 countries  for  which  suitable  data  are  long  production  history  (including  Burma,  Tobago,
available. Because of the poor quality of data, especially  Trinidad, and the United States). Some are OPEC
for  reserves,  the  model  specification  is simple.  countries,  to which  a model  specification  involving
Their  model  relates  reserve  additions  to the  imputed  in  market  price  response  does  not  properly  apply.
situ price  of discovered  but  undeveloped  reserves  and to  Tests on a small sample  of countries  for  differences
the  passage of time.  The  passage  of time  is a surrogate  between  earlier  and  later periods  reveal  limited  evidence
for measuring the net impact on supply conditions of the  of an expansionary shift from 1980 onward.
chance of finding oil, resource depletion, cost efficiency,  There is partial evidence that lower oil prices stimulate
and technology. Time's impact could be expansionary or  productivity.
contractionary.  Watkins and Streifel suggest that a gloomy outlook for
They test two main versions of the model, one a  non-OPEC supply is unwarranted.  Several countries are
straightforward linear function, the other nonlinear,  still in an expansionary phase. Others show no evidence
assuming decreasing returns. Both models yield similar  of entering a period of decline. And countries in a
results.  contractionary phase will continue to add to reserves.
In most cases the models fit the data reasonably  Further research requires improving the database
closely, after adjustment for outliers. The complete  rather than employing more elaborate models.
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iiSUMMARY
The economics of oil supply are at the crux of the outlook for the world oil industry.
Expectations of limited supplies outside of OPEC countries often lie behind the view of those
who foresee a return to OPEC dominance and strong oil price increases.  The major premise here
is that supplies cannot keep pace with consumption growth.  This premise must be examined, not
presumed.
Objectives.  The main objective is to estimate oil supply functions for all countries for
which  suitable data  were available.  The intention is to  provide evidence to  support or  deny
expectations  of  future  oil  scarcity  or  abundance.  Countries  for  which  suitable  data  were
assembled numbered 41. They cover all the major producing regions of the world, excluding the
former Soviet Union.
Model Framework.  Data restrictions dictate  simple model  specification.  Supply  is
represented by oil reserve additions.  The basic model framework relates reserve additions to two
variables.  The  first is  the imputed  insitu price  of  discovered but  undeveloped reserves,  an
important factor governing exploration activity.  Higher reserve prices should increase reserve
additions, other things equal.  The second variable is the passage of time.  This is a surrogate for
measuring the net impact of changes in prospectivity, resource depletion, cost efficiency and
technology on supply conditions.  The impact of time could be expansionary or contractionary.
This framework enables a  distinction to be  made between movements along a supply
function and shifts in its position over time.  It is shifts in the position of the supply function that
are fundamental to the evaluation of oil supply prospects for a given country or region.  The
notion is illustrated in Figure 1 in the main text (page 15).
Data.  Data on proved conventional oil reserves, reserve additions, production, drilling
activity, well costs, development expenditures,  operating costs,  field prices and  other factors
were collected, by country, from the mid  1950s--when available--to 1994.  Poor data quality--
especially for reserves --necessitated frequent adjustments to eliminate anomalies.  And lack of
individual cost information for the majority of countries forced reliance on representative data
from other sources, especially US cost data.
Models  Tested.  Two  main  versions  of  the  basic  model  were  tested.  One  was  a
straightforward linear function.  The other was non-linear, assuming  decreasing returns at any
one point in time: higher prices would increase reserve additions, but at a decreasing rate.  Both
models yielded similar results.
An alternative formulation tested was to use the insitu price of  developed rather then
undeveloped reserves as the explanatory price variable.  This was intended to reflect the fact that
many reserves are added via reservoir development.  No marked change in results occurred with
this formulation and it is not discussed further in this summary.
1Results.  A high  degree of fit was shown in most  cases, after adjustment for outliers.
Results for some countries showed some evidence of perverse price relationships: higher prices
lowering reserve additions,  other things  equal.  But  mostly these were  OPEC countries that
cannot be anticipated to respond directly to market price mechanisms.  This result, then, served
to confirm rather than refute the model specification.
For any one set of model results for the 41 countries, the critical variable expressing shifts
in supply functions over time was statistically insignificant for some 60 percent of them.  This
means that  in most instances there is no evidence of secular movements in supply functions,
either in a contractionary or expansionary direction, over the period of analysis.
In combination the model results revealed 26 countries displaying statistically significant
shifts in supply functions.  These were almost evenly split between those  in an expansionary
phase  and those  suffering contraction.  The latter included countries with  a  long  production
history, such as the US, Trinidad and Tobago and Burma.  Six of the 26 countries showed model
deficiencies  (perverse  price  relationships),  of  which  four  were  for  countries  listed  as
contractionary.  The flavor of these results is brought together in Table S- 1.
Table S-1
Typical Characteristics of Main Results
Country  Consistent  Shifts in
Grouping  Reserves-Price Relationship  Supply Function
Expanding non-OPEC Producers  Yes  Rightward
Contracting non-OPEC Producers  No  Leftward
North America  Yes  Leftward
Other Countries  Ambiguous  Neutral
OPEC  No  Ambiguous
Tests  on a  small sample of countries for differences between earlier and  later periods
displayed limited evidence of a shift in supply functions in a more expansionary direction from
1980 onwards.  If widespread, this may well be the effect of strong technical advances over the
past decade or so, which have significantly reduced costs.  The same small sample of countries
revealed partial evidence that technological change and exploration productivity were stimulated
by  lower  oil prices.  If  so, sustained periods  of flat  oil prices need  not  be  associated  with
deteriorating supply conditions.
2We caution again that the results for many countries are not grounded in a strong set of
underlying data, and that a lack of breakdown  of reserve and cost data prevents estimation of
more finely tuned models.
Conclusions.  Overall, the study suggests that a gloomy outlook for world oil supply in
general and for non-OPEC producers in particular is not warranted.  A lot of countries show no
shift in their supply functions, notwithstanding depletion.  Outside of North America, on balance
many non-OPEC producers have experienced a  rightward, expansionary shift  in their  supply
function.  On the other hand, North America and in particular the USA, is probably moving in
the contrary direction--contracting, with leftward shifts in the supply function of conventional
oil.  This  does  not  mean that a  country  in a  contractionary  phase  will not  continue  to  add
reserves.  Additions from further investment in exploration and development can emerge over a
long period.  Rather, the  implication is that the returns  from  such activity for  a contracting
country are diminishing.
Further  research along the  lines of this  study requires improvements in  the database,
especially reserve and cost data, rather than employment of more elaborate models.
31.  INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE OF STUDY
Petroleum is the world's most widely traded commodity.  Oil prices have fluctuated at
times quite dramatically over the last twenty-five years or so, significantly affecting investment
decisions not only in the oil sector, but in other energy industries as well.  Changes in oil prices
in  part  have  been  attributable  to  the  interaction  between  the  production  practices  of  the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)--which has  sought to  limit output to
generate higher oil prices--and rising volumes of non-OPEC production.
Since the two major price increases of the  1970s, world oil demand has grown much
more moderately than prior to the first oil price shock in 1973. Non-OPEC supplies--outside the
United States and  former Centrally Planned Economies (CPEs)--have increased nearly four-fold
since 1971. The rate of increase slowed following the collapse in oil prices in 1986, but in recent
years production has again risen quite strongly partly due to significant technological advances
and cost reductions.  Since 1989, non-OPEC countries have supplied more than half of the net
increase in demand resulting from the combination of higher consumption and declining output
in some countries--especially the US and the former Soviet Union (FSU).  Since 1993 the non-
OPEC share has been over 80 percent.
Future  oil  prices  primarily  will  depend  upon  three  factors:  levels  of  oil  demand;
availability and costs of oil supplies from all countries; and OPEC production  capability and
production decisions.  This report focuses on the second factor, one that has implications for the
third critical factor as well.
OPEC has had less influence on oil prices since 1986.  Some analysts go so far to state
that OPEC now has little impact on what has become a competitive market, implying that prices
reflect marginal costs of production.  This is not so: OPEC does limit its output; and prices are
significantly above marginal cost in many regions of the world (costs here exclude royalties and
taxes).  Because of OPEC's attempts to maintain relatively high oil prices, the oil market operates
in a seemingly perverse economic environment in which relatively low cost OPEC reserves are
withheld while higher cost supplies elsewhere are developed. I
The conventional wisdom expects rising oil consumption and declining non-OPEC oil
supplies increasing the demand for OPEC oil, inevitably leading to sustained increases in real oil
prices.  Crucial to this outlook is the view that aggregate non-OPEC production will decline.  It is
often based upon the notion that the world is running out of oil (resource scarcity) and that costs
must  therefore increase.  For years,  nearly all non-OPEC supply forecasts have been unduly
pessimistic.  The forecasts usually have production peaking in the very near future and then
declining "forever", almost regardless of the oil price assumptions.  To date these forecasts have
been wrong.  Many such forecasts are still present, although milder, with price implications often
grounded in the expected strong increase in East Asian oil consumption.  But there is an unstated
' Streifel [1995],  and even before  the emergence  of OPEC  as a price setter;  see Adelman  [1972].
2 Lynch  [1992].
4major premise: that supply somehow cannot keep pace with consumption.  This premise should
be examined, not assumed.
Supply Functions.  The concept of  a supply function relates price to  output and the
reserves on  which output depends.  For a  competitive producer price  is equal to  cost at the
margin.  The cost of oil consists mainly of the investment needed to create new reserves, not on
extraction cost.  The higher the price, the more attractive the investment, and vice versa.
In general:  when output grows despite a stable or declining price, the supply curve has
shifted outward, favorably.  Oil has become less scarce.  Contrariwise, when price is stable or
rising and output contracts, the supply curve has shifted inward, unfavorably.  Oil has become
more  scarce.  The  oil  industry  may  lower  its  cost  by  downsizing--cutting  back  on  poorer
prospects and working the better ones.  Similarly, costs may increase by moving up the supply
function, making more use of deeper, more inaccessible deposits.
OPEC oil in general and particularly Middle East oil has always been so cheap that trends
are hard to  detect.  Non-OPEC  oil  has gone  through  several phases  corresponding to  price
movements.  From 1960 through 1970, producers created 18.7 billion barrels of new reserves per
year.  Since prices were stable or declining, the supply curve probably shifted rightward.  From
1970 through 1980, reserves were created at an average of 11 billion barrels per year.  Since real
prices between 1971 and 1980 increased more than tenfold, the supply curve seemingly shifted
far leftward.  From  1980 through  1993, new reserves created were 17.2 billion barrels per year,
and tended to  increase over time.  Since real prices fell over  70 percent through  1986, then
remained stable, the supply curve apparently shifted to the right.  Oil had become much more
plentiful.  To compare pre-1970  with post-1980  is more difficult: expansion was less in  the
1980s, but the price decline was steeper.
Outline of Study.  Our main purpose is to analyze oil supply in all countries for which
suitable data were available, by distinguishing between movements along a supply function and
shifts in the supply function itself.  In all, supply functions were estimated for 41 countries.
The analysis is confined to conventional oil, excluding non-conventional sources such as
oil sands in Canada and Venezuela.  In broad measure, the study brings the approach developed
in Bradley and Watkins [1994] to bear on a multi-country data set. The basic model framework
relates reserve additions to  reserve prices and to time, where time  is a  surrogate for shifts in
supply functions.
The analysis cannot avoid importing a great deal of statistical noise,  since there were
many irregular changes; and reserve errors and misstatements are not mutually offsetting.  But
disaggregation by country seems essential to  learn more about why and how such changes in
reserve additions and apparent shifts in supply functions came about.  In particular: why the
abrupt reversal  of the  long-term  trend toward  greater  oil plenty  during  the  1970s?  Which
countries have led and which  lagged in  the dramatic change since  1980?  We would  like to
address these questions.  However data limitations constrain our ability to compare individual
3 Summary  data taken from comment  by M.A. Adelman.
5decades.  Our analysis is mainly directed at the more modest goal of looking at overall trends
over a period of three decades or more.
In particular the work focuses on whether the overall supply function in the selected non-
OPEC and certain OPEC countries has shifted, and if so, in what direction?  Has it shifted to the
right, indicating that improvements in costs and in 'prospectivity'--the  probability of discovery--
are overcoming the effects of resource depletion?  Or has it shifted to the left, indicating that
depletion is paramount?  These shifts cannot be discerned simply by looking at trends in reserve
additions  (or output) because these will  be heavily  influenced by the  prevailing price which
traces movements along a given supply function.
The report consists of four main sections.  Section 2 discusses key concepts of oil supply
from which two simple models are specified relating reserve additions to price, technology and
'prospectivity'.  Simplicity is dictated by the scope of the data, the topic addressed in Section 3
which  reviews  the  sources  of  data  employed,  discusses  various  adjustments  required  and
comments on the constraints that data availability impose.  Section 4 presents and discusses the
results of the types of models estimated.  Concluding remarks are made in Section 5.  Appendix
A lists the preferred statistical results by model and country.
62.  SUPPLY CONCEPTS AND MODEL SPECIFICATION
The purpose of this section is to discuss key concepts relating to the analysis of petroleum
supply in terms of reserve additions, and to define supply functions amenable to estimation.  It
commences by developing a  framework for linking reserve insitu values or prices to relevant
costs (Part A).  These include development cost (the cost of installing capacity), user cost (the
opportunity  cost  of  producing  now rather  than  later),  and  replacement  cost.  The  review of
replacement cost distinguishes between exploration activities, reservoir extensions, and enhanced
recovery.  Inter alia, how signals of scarcity might be identified is discussed.
In Part B, the notion of the oil supply function is delineated.  Finally, on the basis of this
analysis  two  simple  models are  outlined  that  will  be  used  for  estimation  (Part  C).  These
functions focus on trends in reserve additions in relation to values imputed for reserves in the
ground--a crucial factor governing exploration activity--and to the passage of time, a surrogate
for changes in underlying supply conditions.  The discussion in this section (particularly parts A
and B) draws substantially on that in Bradley and Watkins [1994].
A.  Key Oil Supply Concepts
Reserves
Reserves--specifically proved reserves--represent the prevailing resource inventory of the
industry.  In a closed economy, greater scarcity of reserves would be reflected in prices at the
wellhead  or for the purchase of reserves in the ground.  However, where countries are price
takers in a world oil market, increasing scarcity or more generous supply in individual regions
requires detection by a less visible indicator than prices.  This is because it cannot be assumed
that more, or less, generous supply in one country is mirrored worldwide.  And of itself the world
oil price--as indicated in the introduction--may be a poor register of underlying supply conditions
at any point in time.
Reserve Development and User Cost
Proved  reserves,  as  noted  above,  are the  resource  inventory.  Values  of  developed
reserves are based  on the wellhead price  less extraction cost  (including taxes).  The latter is
usually relatively small compared with price.  Values of undeveloped reserves reflect wellhead
prices less development cost.
To simplify, assume a fixed reserve is drawn down at a constant rate; the analysis can be
readily generalized to the case of exponential production decline.  The reserve is developed and
of known quantity (R barrels).  Development cost is already sunk and does not enter into the
insitu price of the reserve, V ($ per barrel).  The fixed rate of reservoir output, Q (barrels per
year), is set at well capacity and is governed by development intensity.
7Assume both the price per barrel of output (P) and the extraction cost per barrel (C) are
fixed over  the reserve  life with  the  former higher than the  latter (P>C).  If  the volume  of
recoverable reserves were invariant with respect to the fixed level of output (8R/oQ = 0), the life
of the reserve (the production period) would be simply R/Q, designated T.  Since there is no
productivity decline over time, the ratio of remaining reserves to output decreases as reserves are
depleted and reaches unity in the last year.
The insitu value  of the reserve depends on the discounted value of the stream of net
profits that it generates.  Given the simple framework outlined above, this value is equivalent to
the present value of an annuity of (P - C)Q net revenue per year over T years.  Call the annuity
factor 'a'  and write it in continuous form as:  a = (1  -exp(-rT)/r, where 'r'  is the discount rate.
Hence the present  value  of the  stream  of  future production  (PVP)  generated by  the
reserve until exhaustion is given by:
PVP = (P - C)Qa.
Since when aR/oQ  = 0, Q = RIT:
PVP = (P-C) (R/T)a.
Division of this expression by the quantity of reserves, R, yields the insitu price of a developed
barrel of reserve as:
V = (P-C) a/T.  (1  a)
In this expression the decision variable is T, governed by the level of output, Q, which in
turn is governed by the level of development investment, I.  Note that Q is embedded in (la) by
virtue of T=R/Q.
In  the  context  of  determining  optimum  output,  Q*,  the  reserve  is  assumed  to  be
discovered  but  not  developed.  Finding  cost  does  not  have  to  be  considered:  it  is  sunk.
Development cost is expressed per unit of capacity added.  The reserve is fixed and output is set
at the level given by capacity installed.  It follows that the production life is set by the capacity
variable.  That is, T is governed by development intensity.
In  a competitive market,  the objective of  development is to  maximize the  difference
between the present value net revenue, (P-C)Qa, and the present value of the investment required
to obtain Q.  Assume aI/aQ > 0; more output requires more wells because wells are assumed to
produce at capacity.  However, there  is a  resource constraint: cumulative production  cannot
exceed the reserve.  And, since P>C throughout there is no reason not to exhaust the reserve.  So
the constraint is the equality R - QT = 0.
In this case, the profit function can be written:
8it = (P - C )QfT exp(-rt)dt - I(Q)
where  I(Q) is  the  development  investment  function.  The  integral  is  the  annuity  factor  in
continuous form, (1 - exp[-rT])/r.
Optimal Q is obtained by setting marginal profit (7c)  equal to zero:
o'I/8  = (P-C)(1-exp(-rT))/r - (P-C)Texp(-rT) - aI/aQ = 0.
This yields the equality condition:
(P-C)a = aI/8Q + (P-C)Texp(-rT).  (lb)
Expression (lb)  is interpreted as follows.  Selection of Q on the basis of maximizing net
present value entails that the present value of the stream of receipts from installing an extra barrel
of  annual capacity  is equal to  the marginal development cost  per barrel of capacity plus the
present value  of the barrels produced attributable to  the unit increment  in capacity,  if these
barrels were all produced at the end of the life of the reserve.  The latter is the marginal user cost
per unit of added capacity.
User cost is the alternative option of when to produce the capacity installed.  Under the
simple assumptions adopted here this is only at the end of the reserve life.  There is no room to
produce it earlier, given production at capacity under a given development intensity.  To put it
another way,  the  opportunity cost  of  producing  T  barrels of  reserve spread  uniformly  over
T years (the life of the reserve) is the option to extend the reserve's  life.  The present value profit
on those barrels is what lowers the rate of optimal output over what it would be in the absence of
the resource constraint.  User cost slows depletion.
Equation (Ib) is now transformed to an insitu unit basis by dividing by T.  Thus equation
(1) below equates the value of a  barrel of developed reserve, V, given by  its discounted net
revenue per unit of reserve, to its development plus user cost per unit of reserve.
V = (l/T) (P - C)a = (1/T) dI/dQ + muc  (1)
where
V  =  insitu value of a barrel of developed reserves,
T  =  the life index (R/Q ratio)
P  =  field price per barrel of output
C  =  extraction cost per barrel of output
dI/dQ  =  development investment, per unit of capacity,
r  =  the discount rate,
v  =  the discount factor, exp(-rT)
a  =  the annuity factor, [1 - v]/r
muc  =  marginal user cost per barrel of reserve.
9The first expression on the immediate right-hand side of equation (1) represents the value
of a proved barrel of reserve assuming it is produced at a fixed rate, price and extraction cost
over the time  span T.  This component can be  written succinctly as V = m(P-C);  in  industry
practice 'm'  is typically taken to be about 4 0.4 to 0.5.
In a competitive market the price of the insitu developed reserve would equal its marginal
cost, comprising marginal development cost per barrel of reserve plus marginal user cost per
barrel  of  reserve.  Equation  (1) assumes  unit  development  cost  to  be  constant,  dI/dQ = Id,
expressed as dollars per daily barrel of capacity. As discussed, the user cost (or shadow price) of
a barrel of reserves, muc, indicates the future value given up when the incremental barrel of
capacity is developed and oil is produced evenly over the reservoir life.
Rewriting Equation (1) in simpler form yields:
V = m(P-C) = Id (l/T) + muc.  (2)
User Cost and Scarcity
Hotelling's  model of price and output trajectories applies to a fixed quantity of reserves,
given maximization of present value profits5.  In the context  of insitu values it states that m
would  be  unity, with  P-C rising  as  if compounded  at the rate  at which  future earnings  are
discounted.  Thus the value of reserves would rise over time to reflect the increasing user cost.
This  model  has  been  applied  to  oil  reserves  (Miller  and  Upton  [1985a,  1985b]).  Not
surprisingly, the hypothesis of fixed supply doesn't  play very well (Adelman [1990], Watkins
[1992]).
There is a more sophisticated version of the Hotelling model in which the assumption of
fixed supply at uniform development cost is replaced by the assumption that cost will rise at a
known rate as remaining reserves diminish (alternatively, with cumulative output).  Under this
assumption, the cost of reserves has two components as before, the difference is that user cost
now has  a  different  interpretation.  Since the resource will  never be  exhausted--it will just
become so expensive that it will be displaced--user cost relates to using up cheaper reserves.  In
particular, it reflects the fact that using today's  relatively cheap reserves hastens the day when
reliance  must  be  placed  on  more  costly  reserves  (Levhari  and  Liviatan  [1977]).  Here,
development cost, Id, would rise over time  as resource depletion occurred, and marginal user
cost, muc, would fall eventually to zero.  The framework does not comprehend rightward shifts
in  the supply  function.  Rather,  resources are exploited in  strict order  of  ascending cost  by
climbing up the (fixed) supply curve.
This second, somewhat more realistic view of user cost--also referred to as degradation
cost--has in fact been applied to public policy.  In Canada, the National Energy Board for a time
4For  example, see Adelman [1990, p. 6]; also see Adelman and Watkins [1996].
See Hotelling [ 1931  ].
10required that applicants for a license to export natural gas be able to show that the export price
covered not only direct production, processing, and transportation costs, but also user cost (NEB
[1989]).  To compute user cost it was necessary to specify the anticipated supply price of future
reserves.  While this framework was more realistic than the notion of a fixed stock, in practice
there is of course a great deal of uncertainty about the supply and cost of future reserves.  So for
that reason, among others, the policy was abandoned as impractical.
In the context of economic measures of scarcity, user cost  as described is not useful,
inasmuch as the somewhat more realistic version just  described does not readily  lend itself to
measurement.  If it did, a worse problem would surface--user cost would decline as the resource
was depleted.  Some analysts, building on the seminal work of Bamett and Morse (1963), have
relied  on extraction  cost  as  an  index of  scarcity,  which would  be  development cost  in  our
formulation.  This may be a useful index but it has an underlying logical flaw.  If technology
permits  an  economy to  substitute away from the resource  in question,  leftward shifts in  the
derived demand curve could offset increasing extraction cost, so cost would provide a perverse
index of scarcity.  Indeed, in these circumstances the whole notion of scarcity would be of little
interest.
Replacement Cost
Future supply can be pictured as a series of tranches, that is, increments of reserves that
can be developed only at successively higher unit cost.  This structure has been incorporated in
the Hotelling-derived literature, with successive tranches being exhausted (the first type of user
cost) while the whole process conforms to the second type of user cost (degradation cost).
A suitable point of departure is the belief that the quantity of reserves in each tranche is
unknown.  Moreover, at any given time reserves are being created in more than one tranche.  The
assumption of successive exhaustion of fixed quantities of reserves in each tranche fails to take
into account the process by which oil reserves are continuously augmented.  This is achieved by
various types of investment: a) investment in exploration; b) investment in reservoir extensions;
and c)  investment in  enhanced  recovery.  Here, the key  to  detecting  increasing  scarcity  (or
abundance) lies in the trends in replacement cost.
a)  Exploration
One means of adding to reserves in a tranche is to explore for and then develop newly
found  reserves.  This  process  can  be  described  by  a  model  which  assumes  that  T,  the
reserves/production ratio, is fixed at its optimal value for the tranche, at T*.  The total stock of
reserves (R) and total capacity (Q) are variable 7. This is not unrealistic on a company basis.
Company policy could be  to  sustain a target  R/Q ratio.  Or supply contracts may call  for a
constant R/Q ratio.  Any production would need to be replaced by new reserves.
6 An example  is Solow [1974].
7 When  T is fixed, the fixed  resource  constraint  is implicitly  dropped.
11Constrained maximization  will yield  a result  similar to  Equation  (2), except  that the
second  term  on  the  right  would  be  'mrc',  marginal  replacement  cost,  specifically,  the
replacement cost of undeveloped reserves.  Designating marginal replacement cost as mrc yields
the equation:
V=Id(1/T)+mrc.  (3)
Marginal user cost for the tranche (muc) is unobservable, but marginal replacement cost
(mrc) obstensibly could be observed.  Marginal replacement cost can be portrayed as a rising
supply curve, reflecting diminishing returns with increased exploration effort in a given period,
for a given "play."
b)  Reservoir Extensions
Exploration, or wildcat drilling, is not the only means of seeking new reserves.  A second
approach can be characterized as "extensions, " whereby investment in the form of development
drilling  secures  new  reserves  and  simultaneously increases  capacity.  Especially  in  mature
regions,  reserve  appreciation  over  time  is  the  major  source  of  reserve  additions.  On  the
assumption that no further capacity-specific investment need be made, we would have:
V = mdc  (4)
where mdc is marginal development cost.
Here the marginal replacement cost is represented by marginal development cost, that is,
the cost of reserves gained through development drilling.  Again, available information on newly
created reserves won't be broken down on a tranche-by-tranche basis.
c)  Enhanced Recovery
A further means of adding oil reserves is through investment in enhanced recovery.  In
the context of a simple model, it could be treated in various ways.  An extreme assumption is that
enhanced recovery investment adds reserves but not capacity.  Hence it would simply extend the
life of the reservoir. Here the value of the added barrel of reserves would be the value of a barrel
produced in T years, or (P - C)vT, recalling that VT  is the relevant discount factor.  This would
imply, from expression (1), that marginal replacement cost by means of enhanced recovery, mec,
would be related to reserves value by:
V(TvT/a)  = mec.  (5)
A more appropriate assumption about the value of a barrel of reserves  added through
enhanced  recovery would be  that  it  would reduce  the rate  of  decline of production  from  a
reservoir as well as increasing the reserves.  This could be incorporated in a more general model
than the one here that assumes constant output.
12Three ways, then, have been identified of adding to  the stock  of oil reserves--namely
through  exploration, extension and enhanced recovery.  Investment  among these alternatives
would be allocated so as to equate the value gained per dollar of investment at the margin.  The
three supply relations are:
mrc=  V -Id (1/T)  (6)
mdc =V  (7)
mec =  V(TvT/a).  (8)
Recall that these expressions relate to a particular tranche.  Additions  to reserves  are
simultaneously drawn from several adjacent tranches, and at the margin the total cost of reserves
additions will be equated to their value.  The increasing cost of finding more potential reserves in
a particular tranche makes it economic to also exploit reserves in an adjacent tranche with higher
development cost.  We next consider what can be garnered from this framework about resource
depletion.
B.  Reserve Supply Curves
It was noted at the outset that scarcity is best measured by price.  If the derived demand
for crude oil did not diminish, the price of reserves would signal increasing scarcity.  It was also
noted that non-OPEC producing regions are price takers.9 In these circumstances, the derived
demand for reserves reflects the prevailing world price, and this trends upward or downward not
in response to economic scarcity in a given region but rather to contrived scarcity, which is to say
OPEC's  success  at controlling  output.  Thus  for  oil producing regions  price  is  exogenous,
unrelated to any indigenous scarcity.  If price is exogenous, increasing scarcity (or abundance) is
detected by changes in reserve quantities.
An upward sloping supply function is posited for a particular region's discoveries of new
potential reserves.  Recall that if this function were stationary, one could (with the appropriate
data) measure the supply elasticity of a particular 'quality' reserve, that is, for a given tranche.  In
fact, the curve would be expected to be shifting.  Leftward movement would indicate increasing
scarcity--that is, depletion was not  being offset by technology  or new prospects.  Hence the
Booked  reserves  can also be augmented  or diminished  by changes  in wellhead  prices  themselves  (P) since  they, in
combination with extraction cost, will determine well abandonment  and hence the  volume of oil eventually
recovered from a reservoir.  This source of reserve variation is not considered  because it does not involve
investment.
9Also,  to the  extent  that  OPEC  countries have  differences  in preferred  prices,  a  group  price  objective  may
nevertheless leave an individual OPEC country as a price taker.
13desired signal of changes in resource conditions would be the parameters  describing shifts in
supply functions.
These notions are illustrated in Figure 1.  The curve SS is the reserve supply curve at a
given point in time.  A rise in the price of reserves will increase reserve additions as more costly
prospects become economic to develop (and vice versa).
An outward shift in the supply curve is indicated by the curve SASA.  Here the curve is
lowered with costs reduced by technological improvement, or new areas or prospects may attract
activity.  In either case, at a given price, reserve additions increase because prospects with costs
formerly  exceeding price  now become  economic,  or  because new  areas  or  'plays'  become
accessible.  An inward shift in the curve is depicted by the curve SDSD.  Here, at a given price
reserve additions decline;  costs are increasing  and remaining  'prospectivity'  deteriorates--the
resource is becoming more scarce.
The  depiction  of  supply  from  the  two  other  sources  of  potential  reserves  identified
earlier--reservoir extensions and enhanced recovery--would be similar.  Unfortunately, the data
that  would  permit  estimation  of any  of  these  individually  sourced supply  functions  are not
available.  Moreover, the data that are available relating to  reserves additions are not broken
down according to the tranches posited.  In the absence of data specific to the different sources of
reserves, reliance is placed on what can be learned from more piecemeal, aggregate information.
In that light, although for purposes of analysis reserve additions have been broken down
by various sources, now we must, perforce, consolidate.  Figure 2 depicts additions to proved
reserves at varying reserve prices, combining reserves additions from all sources and all tranches.
The incremental supply price is therefore Id(O/T) + mrx, where  mrx  represents the  combined
replacement cost, derived from mrc, mdc and mec (see equations (6), (7) and (8)).
However, the information contained in a curve like that in Figure 2 is not  likely to  be
helpful in  identifying trends  in resource  scarcity  or abundance.  When the  value  of  proved
reserves goes way up, as it did for example after the second price shock of  1979-80, extensive
development drilling  can be  expected where potential  reserves were  known to  exist but  had
previously  been  uneconomic  to  develop.  That  is  to  say,  a  number  of  new  tranches--
corresponding to successively higher development costs--would be exploited.  In this context the
supply response would be largely attributable to the inventory of proved  reserves built up over
time.
What is required is to determine the extent to which the inventory of potential reserves is
being augmented.  This would be specified by a supply curve like that shown in Figure 3.  This
relates  the  supply  of  potential  reserves  to  their  implicit  value,  [V- Id(1/T)], the  difference
between the value of a developed reserve and its cost of development.  This value can be thought
of as a window--it represents the opening, or margin, within which exploration must pay off
14Figure 1
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Legend:  V= in-situ value of developed reserves
I= development cost per unit of proved reserves
mrx= marginal replacement cost
16The opening of the window varies.  When the value of proved reserves (V) falls, the
value of potential reserves [V - Id(1/T)] falls as well, though some of the fall will be offset by
declining development cost, as attention is restricted to the better prospects.  This means that the
exploration margin is being squeezed so that fewer exploration prospects will be entertained: the
quantity of exploration activity will fall. Finding cost, assuming it can be measured, may be seen
as declining.  However, such a decline would not be an indicator of more favorable  exploration
results.
Just as changes in the value of proved reserves in various regions do not of themselves
reflect scarcity, neither do changes in the implied value of potential or undeveloped reserves,
[V - Id(1/T)].  If the reserve were  not potentially  depletable,  the supply-demand  relationship
depicted in Figure 3 would allow us to estimate the curve describing marginal replacement cost.
One must contend, however, with the offsetting forces of depletion plus rising cost, and technical
advance plus new prospects (see Figure 1).  The key question is whether the supply curve (mrx)
in Figure 3 is stationary or shifting, and if the latter, in which direction?
We now specify two supply models that attempt in a simple way to capture the distinction
between movements along a supply function and  inward or outward shifts in it.
C. Estimating Equations for Supply of Reserves
First Model
A simple  reduced form  supply  function can be  specified  for potential  (undeveloped)
reserves as a function of their value and of time.  The function can be written as:
RA = a + b(V -I) + ct  (9)
where
RA =  reserves additions in the given period
t  =  time
V  =  value of barrel of developed reserves in the ground
I  =  development investment per unit of  proved reserve.
The time  variable, t,  is a  surrogate for  changes in  'productivity',  and the  sign of  its
coefficient, c, is critical.  A positive "c" indicates a rightward shift in the supply curve over time;
the remaining reserve endowment is expanding.  A negative "c" indicates a leftward shift:  the
remaining reserve endowment is less generous  .
10  A possible alternative  to the time variable is cumulative  oil production  (for example, see Scarfe and Rilkoff
[1984]),  which in turn is normally  well correlated  with time.  However,  our focus is on potential  reserves;  their
shifts  would  not be well  represented  by output  from developed  reserves. Hence  a preference  for time.
17A priori,  the "b" coefficient of equation (9) is expected to be positive:  the greater the
spread between insitu values and the cost of placing reserves on production, the greater would be
potential reserve additions.  This spread is an estimate of the price of undeveloped reserves, what
was  referred  to  earlier  as  the  window  of  opportunity for  exploration.  Higher  prices  of
undeveloped reserves encourage exploration activity.  To test for possible lagged relationships,
equation (9) can also be expressed with a one year lag (V-I) -I and a two year lag (V-I) -2 
The data available for estimating this model are not what would be preferred.  There are,
of  necessity,  no reliable  data  describing the  additions  to  potential  or  undeveloped  reserves.
Therefore we postulate that trends in the level of additions to proved reserves for a given value of
such reserves reflect the success over time of all methods for replenishing the stock of potential
reserves.  The  assumption  implies  a  consistent  proportional  relation  between  potential  and
proved reserves.
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Regular  patterns  of proved  reserve appreciation,  for which  there  is some  evidence
provide support for the assumption. But equally it might be expected that additions to potential
reserves would shrink faster than additions in proved reserves.  If so, the model would tend to
understate any underlying resource depletion. No solution is seen to this problem without a finer
distinction among the reserve and cost data.
Earlier mention was made that for many regions--especially as they mature--the main
source  of  reserve  additions  is  from  reservoir  development  activity  or  reserve  appreciation
(extensions  and  enhanced  recovery).  This  suggests that  the  imputed  price  of  appreciated
reserves, V-IC,  where IC  represents development costs not related to reservoir appreciation (such
as infill drilling), as well as the imputed price of undeveloped reserves, V-I, might be influential
in determining reserve additions.  Since no information is available on Ic, the value of developed
reserves, V, is used as a surrogate. t3
Hence  an  alternative  specification  of  equation  (9)  is  to  eliminate  the  term  'I'  from
equation (9). Here the equation would become:
RA  = a + bV + ct.  (9a)
As for equation (9), equation (9a) can also be expressed with one and two year lags for V.
Second Model
Another simple approach is grounded in and adapted from the hypothetical supply curves
sketched in Adelman  [1990, p29].  Again the notion is of a pristine  supply function--reserve
additions plotted against the (insitu) price of reserves.  The function is forced through the origin:
zero price, zero reserve additions.  Also, the function is assumed to be concave upwards, not a
I  IAs Paul Bradley has pointed out.
12 See ERCB [1969] and Attanasi and Root [1994].
13 This need not distort the statistical significance of behavioral parameters if 1,  were a constant fraction of V.
18straight  line,  implying  diminishing  returns  for  reserve  additions  as  the  price  increases.  A
logarithmic transformation for the price term would be a simple expression of this feature.  Call
the slope of the function 'x'.  It is the ratio of the log of the insitu  price to reserve additions:
x =ln(V  -I+  I) /RA.  (I10)
where RA is reserve additions, V is the (real) insitu price of reserves, and I is development cost.
The '+I'  element in (10) is to ensure that when V-l= 0, RA = 0.
The key concern is what happens to 'x'  over time.  If in this model costs were decreasing
via shifts in the slope of the curve rather than through movements along the curve, then 'x'  will
be declining, that is the curve will be shifting downwards to the right.  If costs are increasing,
then 'x'  will be increasing and the curve will be becoming steeper.
For any country, 'x'  can be  calculated as given by expression (10) for each year.  To
capture lagged relationships two sets of values for 'x'  are computed, one where (V-I) and RA are
contemporaneous, and one where there is a two year lag on (V-I)
Similarly to  the first model,  equation  (10) can also be  defined by  using the price  of
developed reserves, V, rather than the price of undeveloped reserves, V-I.  If so the equation
becomes:
x = ln(V + 1)/ RA.  (I Oa)
And again V can also be expressed as a two year lag.
Any one set of values of  'x'  by year  {xt} generated by equations (10) or (lOa), were
simply regressed on a time counter:
x=  b + ct.  (11)
Interest focuses on the sign of the 'c'  coefficient attached to the time variable.  If it were
negative, that would indicate more generous supply; if positive, more constrained supply'4.
Summary of Approach
Overall, the detection of trends in resource conditions must focus on reserve additions.  In
current market  circumstances, of themselves these quantities will not  signal trends.  Instead,
attention  must  be  directed toward  how  the industry  is responding  over  time  in  the  face  of
changing values.  The most useful analysis is a comparison among countries.
14 Note the difference  in interpretation  between  the time coefficient  (t) between  the first and second  models. In the
first  model  a positive  "t" indicates  expanding  supply,  and in the second  model,  contracting  supply.
19We attempt to estimate simple oil supply functions implicit in equation (9) and equation
(10) (and equations (9a) and (lOa)) for 41 oil producing countries around the world.  Many are
non-OPEC oil exporting countries, some are net oil importers but nevertheless with significant
levels  of  production.  Several  major  Middle  East oil  producing  countries  and  other  OPEC
countries are included.  These countries have been restraining output and development  in an
effort to maintain higher oil prices.  Previous surplus capacity has left them with little incentive
to develop new reserves over the past two decades.  In fact, a priori,  we expect to find neither
model appropriate for the main OPEC producers.
The form of the equations to  be tested is intended to  enable conclusions to  be drawn
about movements in supply functions over time--whether they are shifting to the right or left.
The implications of such findings in the context of the world oil market were drawn earlier.
For a limited sample of countries, equations are estimated by dividing the data set into an
earlier and later period to  test for differences in model coefficients over time.  Moreover, an
attempt is made to introduce a composite time-related coefficient (c + dt) in the first model to see
whether  any  time-related  shifts  (representing  changes  in  technology,  efficiency  and
prospectivity) appear to be increasing or diminishing as a function of the level of field prices.
The next section describes the data collection efforts pursued to enable estimation of the
models specified.
203.  THE DATA
The intent was to estimate oil supply world functions in all the regions of the world--
South America, North America, Europe, Africa, Middle East and Asia, but excluding the former
Soviet Union (FSU).  In the end, the usable data set was  for 41 countries.
This section describes the data used to estimate the equations specified in Section 2.  The
three crucial elements here are: reserve additions; reserve prices; and development costs.  Table
3.1 overleaf is a general key relating to the sources and data definition  Details and manipulations
relating to  each main element of data are provided below.  A complete set of data for all 41
countries is available from the World Bank.
The  data  set  is  built  upon  earlier  work  by  Adelman  and  Shahi'5,  estimating  oil
development-operating costs for 40 or so oil-producing nations from 1955 to 1985 from publicly
available  data.  We updated these  data to  1994, and then  extracted the  necessary items  for
construction of our data set--items primarily relating to investment expenditures, production and
reserve data.  Data (to 1985) for Rows  1 through 8a in Table 3.1 are from Adelman and Shahi.
These data are described in detail in their paper, of which a description is summarized below.
As indicated in the sources used, the desired data for all countries are not available.  And
indeed the data for some countries, for example Thailand, were sufficiently flawed as to warrant
their removal from the initial selection.  Four countries were added to the Adelman-Shahi data
set--Canada, Norway,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States--and these  are  discussed
separately below.
Wells Drilled and Average Depth
Wells drilled refers to all types of wells (oil, gas, dry, exploratory, development), and are
obtained from the August "International Outlook" issues of World Oil, published two years after
the year in question, (Row 1 of Table 3.1).  In Row 2 the approximate average well depth is
calculated by dividing the total footage drilled by the total number of wells drilled, also taken
from the August World Oil issue.
Average Costs Per Well
The figures for average costs in Row 3a reflect the cost of drilling an onshore well of a
given depth in the USA in 1985. It is generally assumed that drilling costs for a given depth are
the same across all nations and are equivalent to  the US drilling costs. 6  No country-specific
drilling costs are available.  For each depth class, the cost of drilling an onshore well in 1985 is
calculated using figures published by the US Department of Energy, Indexes and Estimates of
15 Adelman,  M.A.  and Manoj  Shahi,  [1989]. We are grateful for  provision  of these  data on disk.
16 This assumption is not distortive given widespread use of US equipment, a competitive equipment market, and
the low labor intensity of drilling cost.
21Table  3.1 Sources  of  Country  Oil  Reserve  Development  Cost  and  Price  Data.
Row  Variable  Source or formula
I  Wells drilled  August "International  Outlook" Issue, World Oil
2  Approximate average well depth (thousand ft)  (Total footage drilled/wells drilled); total footage drilled from intemational Outlook issue, World Oil
3a  1985  Average cost/well  ($million)  Calculated from costs given in "Indexes and Estimates of Domestic Well Drilling costs 1984 and 1985,  DOE/EIA-0347(84-85) and average depth in Row 2
3b  Ditto., adjusted  Row 3a multiplied by the ratio of as indicated by adjustment class.
3c  Adjustment class  See note below
3c.1  Adjustment (a): total US  Total US drilling cost from Joint Association Survey on drilling costs
3c.2  (JAS) onshore  Total onshore US drilling cost from Joint Association Survey on drilling costs
3c.3  Adjustment (aa): offshore  Total offshore US drilling cost from Joint Association Survey on driling costs
3c.4  (JAS) onshore  Total onshore US drilling cost from Joint Association Survey on drilling costs
4  Investment ($million)  Adjusted average cost x wells drilled = (Row 3b x Row 1 X 1.66)
5  Average output, thousand bbl/day  Intemational Outlook Issue, World Oil
6  Operating wells (year-end)  Intemational Outlook issue, World Oil
7  Average output per well (thousand bbl/day)  Average daily output/number of operating wells = (Row 5/Row 6)
8  Year-end reserves (billion bbl)  Oil and Gas Joumal, Year-end Worldwide Production Report
8a  Adjusted year-end reserves (billion bbl)  Adjusted for unusual swings in reserve data
9  Annual Oil Production (million barrels)  Annual production = (Row 5 x 365/1000)
10  Reserve additions (million bbl)  Change in adjusted  year-end reserves plus annual production =  ((Row 8a(t) - Row 8a(t-1)) x 1  000) +  Row 9  (if calculation negative  use Row 9)
r'3  (Original calculation. If negative  Row 10=Row 9)  If calculation in Row 10 is negative, annual production is used for reserve additions.
11  Cost reserve additions (1985$/bbl)  Investment/reserve  additions, adjusted for inflation = (Row 4/Row 10)/(Row 13*100)
11  a  Adjusted cost reserve additions (1985$/bbl)  Adjusted for unusual swings in cost calculations
12  Representative field price ($/bbl)  Annual average prices for bechmark crudes; PIW, other sources
13  US GDP Deflator (1985=100)  World Bank
14  Real Field Prices (1985$/bbl)  Constant $1985 field price = (Row 12/Row 13 x 100)
15  Operating costs (1  985$/bbl)  Vares  according to square root of output, and proportional to constant 1985 US operating costs ($3/b for well producing 50 b/d)= 3/(Sq Rt (Row 7150))
16  Net Prices (1  985$fbbl)  Real field price minus operating costs = Row 14 - Row 15
17  (1) In-situ pnce of developed reserves (1985$/bbl)  Net Price x 0.4 = (Row 16 x 0.4)
1  8  (2) In-situ price of developed reserves (1  985$/bbl)  Real field price x 0.3 = (Row 14 x 0.3)
Notes:  Drilling costs per well (Row 3b) are adjusted for mixed (both onshore and offshore) drilling.
Only those fields with average daily production equal to at least 3% of the national  output are used.
Adjustment Class:  (a)=Row Jc. 1/Row 3c.2 (correction for mixed drilling)
(aa)=Row  3c.31Row  3c.4 (correction for entirely offshore drilling)
(b)=maximum cost/Row 3a. Maximum costs calculated from DOE and shore cost from JAS
Used only for Iran and Nigeria
Row numbers refer to data format. The complete set of data tables are availabie from the World Bank.Domestic Well Drilling Costs, 1984 and 1985.  For Iran and Nigeria, where costs are very high
due to exceptionally difficult drilling conditions, maximum rather than average values are used.
When a country  is engaged in mixed  drilling (both  onshore and  offshore) or entirely
offshore,  Row 3a  is multiplied  by  the appropriate weights  calculated from  the current  Joint
Association  Survey on  Drilling  Costs  (JAS) for  each  year, and  is  shown  in  Row  3b.  For
countries engaged  in both offshore  and onshore drilling  the weight used  is the ratio of total
drilling expenditures per well to onshore drilling expenditures per well for a given depth class
(from Row 3c.1 and Row 3c.2).  For entirely offshore drilling countries, the weight used is the
ratio of offshore drilling expenditures per well to onshore drilling expenditures per well (from
Row 3c.3 and Row 3c.4).
Alignment to  1985 data is partly dictated by lack of data to provide a consistent time
series.  But it is also deliberate in that technological change that may increase or decrease unit
drilling costs (especially decreasing them since 1985), one element of technological change that
the time variable in the estimation equations (see Section 2) is intended to capture.
Total Country Investment
Total country investment is the adjusted average cost  per well multiplied by the total
number of wells drilled in that given year (Row 3b x Row 1).  However this represents strictly
drilling costs.  There are other important expenses for overhead, lease equipment, etc.  These
expenses have historically been about 66% of drilling costs.  Thus drilling costs are raised by this
percentage in  Row 4.  This "Investment"  calculation is somewhat upward  biased because it
includes not only oil wells, but also development wells in non-associated gas fields.  We have
not been able to segregate gas wells not related to oil developments.
Output, Operating Wells and Average Output Per Well
Output  in  Row  5  is  the  average  number  of  barrels  of  oil  produced  daily  per  year.
Operating wells in Row 6 are the total number of wells producing naturally or artificially at year
end.  These figures are from the August "International Outlook" issue of World Oil, published
two years after the year in question.  Average output per well in Row 7 is total oil output divided
by the number of operating wells at year end (Row 5/Row 6).
Reserves and Production
Oil reserves in Row 8 are taken from the year-end Worldwide Production issue of the Oil
and Gas Journal.  The published reserves are as of January 1 of the upcoming year, but treated as
reserves at the end of the current year.
For some countries, reserves show erratic annual fluctuations upwards and downwards.
And for some years the reserves do not appear to be reasonable or consistent estimates.  Often
aggregate reserves were probably overestimated and then subsequently corrected.  Or they may
even have been  manipulated.  In  certain cases,  it may  have  been an  error  in  recording  or
23publishing reserves, e.g.,  Saudi Arabia in  1976.  Sometimes the erratic fluctuations were only
observed  for a  few  years  while  in  other countries  they  extended  for  several years.  These
fluctuations severely distort the critical calculation of "Reserve Additions" in Row 10.
Where erratic figures occurred, reserves figures were adjusted or "smoothed"  to remove
unusual  fluctuations and  show more consistent trends,  largely on a judgmental  basis.  These
adjusted reserve figures are shown in Row 8a, immediately below published reserve figures.  The
reader is able to see where all adjustments were made.  The adjustments were simply to smooth
erratic fluctuations--there was no attempt to reverse obvious trends.
Annual  oil  production  in  Row  9  is  simply  the  average  daily  oil  output  in  Row  5
multiplied by the number of days in the given year.
Reserve Additions and Cost of Reserve Additions
Reserve additions are the change in remaining reserves between years, plus production
during the year.  That is, net reserve additions in Row 10 is calculated by taking the reserves at
the end of  a given year minus the reserves  in the preceding  year, and then  adding the total
number of barrels produced in the current year.
In some cases downward revisions to reserves resulted in negative reserve additions, even
after adjustments to the aggregate reserve data mentioned above.  Negative  reserve additions
imply revision of previous reserve estimates.  In the absence of information on when to attribute
such revisions, where negative reserve additions occurred production for that year (Row 9) was
used for reserve additions in Row 10.  In cases where production figures have been substituted,
the original calculation  of negative reserve additions is shown  immediately below  the entry.
Again, the reader can observe all cases where such adjustments were made.
The deflated cost of reserve additions in Row  11 is the estimated real average cost of
adding a barrel of oil to reserves in a given year.  It is calculated by dividing total investment in
Row 4 by the net reserve additions in Row  10, and adjusted for inflation using the US  GDP
deflator in Row 13.  In some cases fluctuations in the estimated cost of reserve additions were
erratic.  This  was  often attributed  to  a  very  low  reserve additions  figure that  resulted  in  a
seemingly high cost calculation, e.g., Saudi Arabia in  1982.  In the few instances where cost
calculations differed very markedly from an established trend, the figures were adjusted in Row
1  la.  For example, Saudi Arabia was adjusted in 1982.
Field Prices and Operating Costs
Representative field prices are shown in Row 12.  They are mainly spot f.o.b. oil prices
from Petroleum Intelligence  Weekly.  Prices were not  available for the entire  sample period.
Here differentials among the spot prices available were calculated and extended backwards to the
beginning  of the  sample  period,  1955.  Where  spot  prices  were  not  available,  spot  prices
available in a given region were used.  Where a different countries' price was used, it is so noted
immediately under Row 12.  There was no attempt to adjust these prices for transportation costs
24back to the field.  Nor was there an attempt to correct for differences in crude quality.  Most of
the prices used were for a light/medium crude.  Thus the representative field prices may err on
the high side.
Real field prices (1985 US$/bbl) are  shown in Row  14.  The nominal  field prices in
Row 12 were adjusted for inflation by the US GDP deflator in Row 13.
Operating costs are calculated in Row 15.  For most countries, operating costs are not
available, and therefore need to be estimated.  It is assumed that operating costs vary according
to the square root of output per well17, and are proportional to US operating costs.  US operating
costs in  1985 dollars are assumed to  be $3/bbl for a well producing 50 barrels per day'8. It
assumed that operating costs per barrel of production were constant throughout the period.
For a given year in each country, the $3/bbl US constant cost is divided by the square
root  of  the  ratio  of  the  average  daily  well  production  (Row  7)  over  the  reference  well
productivity (50 b/d).  These costs are in real terms (1985 US$/bbl).
An absence of operating cost data by country entails reliance on US data.  To the degree
that operating costs are labor intensive and that fiscal takes vary (see below),  operating costs
attributed to a given country will be flawed. However, operating costs are not a crucial variable.
Insitu Price of Developed Reserves
The real  field  price  minus  operating  costs  is calculated  in  Row  16 (Row  14 minus
Row 15).
The estimated insitu  prices of  developed reserves are shown  in Rows  17 and  18.  In
Row 17, the insitu value of a developed barrel of oil is calculated as 40% of the net price value in
Row 16.  In Row 18, the insitu  value is calculated as 30% of the real field price in Row  14.
These ratios are based on data in Adelman and Watkins [1996, p85].  That paper relates to the
US.  The operating costs used in arriving at the net price include a rent component (royalties and
severance taxes).  This wedge of rent for the yardstick well is implicit in the calculation of insitu
values elsewhere--which of  course may not  hold.  However, some  unpublished estimates by
Adelman  using  1991  international  transactions  showed  ratios  of  0.36  to  0.41  which  are
compatible with the assumption of  0.4 factor we used.
Nevertheless,  we do caution  that variations  in  fiscal regimes  across countries are not
reflected in our insitu  prices.  However, to the extent that the fiscal take per value of a reserve
barrel were constant over time  for a  given country, the assumption of a 0.4 factor would not
noticeably distort estimation of model coefficients since if the appropriate factor were, say, 0.7 it
would simply act as a scaling factor and not affect their statistical significance.
'  Adelman [1972, p.47].
18Adelman  and Watkins [1996, p24]; 1992 adjusted to 1985 using the US GDP deflator.
25Data for Norway, United Kingdom, United States, and Canada
These important oil producers are outside of the Adelman-Shahi data set.  Extensive data
are available for these countries, and thus it was not necessary to estimate the insitu values and
certain costs  using  the same  lengthy process  described beforehand.  The presence  of  direct
development and operating expenditures reduced any need for data manipulation.t9 Moreover
the  data  were  available  for  oil  developments  only,  and  thus  exclude  expenditures  for  non-
associated gas wells.  The tables for these four countries are different in form from the other
countries, and are included in the complete data set (available from the World Bank).
Norway and the United Kingdom.  Oil  development  and  operating  expenditures  and
production figures were supplied by Petroleum Economics Limited.  Reserve figures are from the
Oil and  Gas Journal.  The representative field price for both countries  is the UK Brent spot
price.
Operating costs per barrel (1985$) are calculated from nominal  operating expenditures
and  from  average output, and  adjusted for inflation.  All  other calculations  are as described
beforehand (reserve additions, cost of reserve additions, field prices, operating costs, and insitu
prices).
United States.  For the US, direct data were  available for development expenditures,
reserve additions, cost of reserve additions, and insitu values.  These were largely obtained from
publications by Adelman et. al.  These data only go to  1992; thus the estimation period only
extends to this year as well.
The  real  cost  of  reserve  additions  is  calculated using  the  nominal  costs  of  reserve
additions,  and  adjusted  for inflation.  Similarly  the real  insitu value  is calculated  from  the
nominal insitu value.
Canada.  Data for Canada were obtained from the Canadian Association for Petroleum
Producers,  Statistical  Handbook,  1995.  Data  include  gross  additions  to  reserves,  oil
development expenditures, operating expenditures for oil wells, and the average crude oil price.
The latter three variables are shown in real terms per barrel.  Net prices were calculated.  Two
insitu values were defined according to whether these were predicated on gross or net prices.
We now turn to the results  obtained from estimating the supply functions specified in
Section 2 using the data described in this section.
19 For example, development expenditure data seemed sufficiently comprehensive as to not require adjustment for
overhead and lease equipment, as described earlier from the Adelman-Shahi data set.
264.  ESTIMATION RESULTS
Two simple model specifications were developed in Section 2.  To recapitulate: the first
(Model  1) treats reserve additions as a straightforward linear function of the imputed price of
undeveloped reserves and of time.  The second model (Model 2) estimates the slope of a notional
supply function over time by calculating the ratio of the logarithm of the price of undeveloped
reserves to  reserve additions for each year.  These annual values are then regressed  on time.
Both models were also redefined to use the imputed price of developed rather than undeveloped
reserves.
Interest  mainly  focuses  on  the  behavior  of  the  time  variable  for  each  country,  the
surrogate for measuring the net impact of depletion, technological and efficiency changes and
'prospectivity'  on the oil supply function for a given country.  That is, 'time'  is the variable for
measuring whether the supply curve is shifting inward or outward (see Figure I earlier).
Full details on the statistical results are provided in tables appearing in Appendix A.  For
convenience, the results are listed there by country in alphabetical order.  The commentary below
draws on the information in Appendix A and provides summary tables.
One technical statistical issue is that of identification.  If market prices were endogenous
and set by the interaction of demand and supply functions, then in general both functions need to
be simultaneously estimated.  However, during the 1950s and 1960s oil price 'management'  by
major oil companies made prices essentially exogenous for any one country.  Exogeneity of price
also applied beyond 1970 for non-OPEC countries--either through adherence to prices set in the
world oil market, or through price regulation.  For OPEC countries, attempts at price setting
made prices partly endogenous, which perhaps accounts for some of the deficiencies evident in
the models  estimated for these countries  (see  later).  Overall,  we are  satisfied that  with the
exception of some OPEC countries we have been able to  identify supply functions by model
estimation on a stand alone basis.
We start by looking at Model  1 (Part A).  There are two main versions of this model,
depending on how the time series are expressed.  In addition. there are two subsidiary versions
for a few countries, intended to test for differences within the estimation periods, and for the
relationship between the level of oil prices and technological change.  Adjustments were made
for outlier values of the dependent variable (reserve additions), notwithstanding the smoothing of
certain reserve data discussed in Section 3.
Part B looks at results for Model 2.  There were no variations of this model, except the
testing of a two period lag for reserve prices.  Again, adjustments were made to accommodate
apparent outliers.
Models  I  and 2 were  also estimated with the price  of developed reserves  rather than
undeveloped reserves.
27Conventional  Durbin-Watson procedures were  used  to  detect autocorrelation.  Where
detected, adjustments were made to parameter estimates, assuming  first order autocorrelation.
No formal test was made for heteroscedasticity.  Visual inspection of the data indicated few if
any secular trends that might provoke a systematic change in the variance of the error term over
time.
The discussion below, among other things, covers: adjustments to the data in the model
estimation exercise; the degree of fit; lagged relationships; autocorrelation; and coefficient signs.
A.  Results for Model 1 (Linear Model)
To recapitulate, the basic specification for Model 1 was  20:
RA = A + b(V-I) +ct
where
RA =  reserves additions in the given period
t  =  time
V  =  value of barrel of developed reserves in the ground
I  =  development investment per unit of proved reserve.
There are four variants for Model  1.  The first employs the straightforward time series
data, adjusted as described below.  This is termed Model  1A.  The second variant, Model IB,
employs three year moving averages for the dependent variable (reserve additions) and for the
independent variable, the price of undeveloped reserves.  The time variable is aligned to  the
center of the moving average.  The third Model simply splits the time period to which Models
IA and  lB apply.  The fourth variant, Model  ID, extends the basic model to include an insitu
field price-time interaction term.
The results  summarized in  Table  4-1, which relate to  Model  IA and  iB,  are for the
preferred  choice among various runs.  Such choices mainly related to  alternative lags for the
reserve price variable.  The choice criteria included the degree of fit, the statistical significance of
the variables, and the plausibility of their signs.
Model ]A  (Strict Time Series Data)
Adjustments to the Data.  As discussed in Section 3, various adjustments were made to
the raw data.  But where  outlier values still emerged  for certain years  for various  countries,
dummy variables were inserted in the regression equation.  In Table 4-1, the presence or absence
of dummy variables for a given country is shown in column 6.  Such dummies were confined to
the intercept in the regression equation.  That is, the dummies related to outlier values for reserve
20 See equation  (9),  Section  2.
28additions (RA) , not to the slope coefficient attaching to the imputed value of insitu undeveloped
reserves (V-I).  Separate dummies were assigned to each year in which an outlier was identified.
Dummy variables were inserted in 31 of the 41 sets of country data examined.  In other
words,  some  75 per  cent of the countries had  apparent  outliers.  But  in most  instances one
dummy was sufficient, that is, outliers were confined to one year of the data for a given country.
Problems relating to data for the price of undeveloped reserves,  V-I, were dealt with
directly either via adjustments to the development cost per barrel of reserves, I, as described in
Section 3, or by eliminating years for which there were negative values of V-I.  The rationale
here is that while the value of undeveloped reserves could be zero, in the absence of contingent
claims or the like it would not be reasonable to admit negative values.  The owner would not pay
the developer to acquire the owner's  property or the rights to exploit it.  Moreover, the insitu
values  of  developed  reserves,  V,  were  treated  as non-negative.  An  exception would  be  if
developed reserves were on production at a loss (wellhead revenues were less than extraction
costs) and there were significant costs to be incurred in shutting down wells.  Such situations
were not identified in the analysis, dealing as it does with country aggregate data.
Recall that V is calculated from the formula 0.4(P-C), where P is the field price of oil and
C is the operating cost (see Section 3).  When average production per well is low, as it would be
early in the life of a region under development or when reservoirs are nearing exhaustion, the
well production rate sensitive formula (see Section 3) used for calculating operating costs could
result in negative values for P-C.  Such negative values were suppressed.  Thus, for any country,
years where net field prices (P-C) were negative were removed from the observations included in
the regression analysis. Typically such years were early in the period of analysis where a country
was undergoing initial development, or late in the period if wells were approaching exhaustion.
As mentioned above, years with negative values for V-I were also removed.  This need normally
arose where high development costs associated with intensive well drilling were not matched by
reserve additions.
Degree of Model Fit.  Table 4-1 distinguishes between poor, modest and high degrees of
fit.  The measure  is  the  adjusted  R 2 (adjR 2).  Poor is  defined  as  adjR 2 <  0.1;  modest  as
0.1 < adjR  < 0.5; and high as adjR2 > 0.5.
Of the total of 41 country sets, 30 or some 70 per cent had high fits, six were medium,
and five were classified as poor.  This quite favorable result partly reflects  screening--the R 2 was
one of the criteria in choosing the so-called best results listed in Table 4-1.  Also, several high
fits were attributable to the way the dummy variables absorbed the impact of outliers.
Lagged Price Relationships.  The conventional  equation  specification makes reserve
additions a function of the attributed price of undeveloped reserves (V-I) in that year, and  of
time.  Obviously,  changes in  reserve additions  for a  given year might  be  affected more by
changes in reserve prices one or two years prior, rather than just by changes in the current year.
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Summary of Results for Model 1
Model IA  Model lB
Adjusted  Sign of  Lag of  Sign of  Auto  Dummy  Adjusted  Sign of  Lag of  Sign of  Auto  Dummy
R
2 V - I  V - I  Time  Correlation  Variable  R2 V - I  V - I  Time  Correlation  Variable
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)
Abu Dhabi  h  neg  LO  neg*  N  Y  h  neg  LO  neg  Y  y
Algeria  p  pos  L2  neg  Y  N  h  pos  LO  neg  Y  N
Angola  h  pos  LI  pos  Y  N  h  pos  LI  neg  Y  Y
Argentina  p  pos*  LO  pos  N  N  m  pos*  LO  pos  Y  N
Australia  p  pos  LO  pos  N  N  m  pos  LO  pos  Y  N
Bahrain  h  neg  LO  pos  N  Y  h  neg*  LO  pos  Y  Y
Bolivia  h  neg  L2  pos  N  Y  h  pos  LO  pos  Y  Y
Brazil  m  neg  LI  pos*  N  Y  h  neg  LI  pos*  y  y
Brunei  h  pos*  LO  neg  Y  Y  h  neg  LO  neg*  N  y
Brunei/Malaysia  h  pos*  LO  pos*  N  N  h  pos*  LO  pos*  N  N
Burma  h  pos  LI  neg*  Y  Y  m  neg  LO  neg  Y  N
Cameroon  h  pos*  LI  pos  N  Y  h  pos*  LO  pos*  N  N
Canada  m  pos*  LO  neg  Y  N  h  pos*  LO  pos  Y  N
Colombia  h  neg  LO  pos  N  Y  m  neg  LI  pos  Y  Y
Congo  h  pos  LO  pos*  N  Y  m  pos  LO  pos*  N  Y
Dubai  h  neg  LO  neg  N  Y  h  neg  LI  pos  N  Y
Ecuador  p  neg  LO  neg  Y  N  h  pos  LO  pos  Y  Y
Egypt  h  pos  L2  pos*  Y  Y  h  neg  LI  pos*  N  N
Gabon  h  neg  LO  neg  Y  Y  h  neg  LO  pos  Y  Y
India  h  pos  LI  pos  N  Y  h  pos  LO  pos  N  Y
Key
Column (1), (7)  p = poor R2 (<0.1); m = modest R 2 (0.1 - 0.49); h = high R  (0.5+)
Column (2), (8)  positive or negative; * = statistically  significant at 90% confidence level; some 85% levels included
Column (3), (9)  LO=  no lag; LI = one period lag; L2 = two period lag
Column (4), (10)  positive or negative; * = statistically  significant at 90% confidence level; some 85% levels included
Column (5), (1I1)  Y = yes; N = no
Column (6), (12)  Y  = yes; N = no
Note: V = insitu  value of developed reserves; I = development cost per unit of reserveTable 4-1
Summary  of Results  for Model  1
Model  1A  Model lB
Adjusted  Sign of  Lag of  Sign of  Auto  Dummy  Adjusted  Sign of  Lag of  Sign of  Auto  Dummy
R2  V - I  V - I  Time  Correlation  Variable  R
2 V-I  V - I  Time  Correlation  Variable
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (I1)  (12)
Indonesia  m  pos  LO  neg  N  Y  h  pos  LO  pos  Y  N
Iran  h  neg  LO  neg  N  Y  h  neg  LO  neg  Y  Y
Iraq  h  pos*  L2  neg  N  Y  h  pos*  L I  neg  Y  Y
Kuwait  h  neg  LO  neg  N  Y  h  pos  LO  neg*  N  y
Libya  h  neg*  LO  neg*  N  Y  m  neg*  LO  neg*  N  Y
Malaysia  h  pos  LO  pos*  N  Y  h  pos  LO  pos  N  Y
Mexico  h  pos*  L2  neg  N  Y  h  pos*  LO  neg*  N  Y
Neutral Zone  m  neg  LO  neg*  N  Y  h  neg  LO  neg*  Y  Y
Nigeria  h  neg  LI  neg  Y  Y  h  neg*  LO  neg*  y  y
Norway  m  pos  L2  pos*  N  N  h  pos*  LI  pos*  Y  N
LO  Oman  h  pos  LO  pos*  N  Y  h  pos  LO  pos  Y  N
Peru  h  pos*  LI  pos  Y  Y  h  pos*  LO  neg  N  Y
Qatar  h  neg*  LO  pos  N  Y  h  neg  LO  neg  Y  Y
Saudi Arabia  h  pos  LO  neg  N  Y  h  pos  LO  neg  Y  Y
Syria  h  neg  L2  pos*  N  Y  m  neg  LI  pos  Y  N
Trinidad  h  neg*  LO  neg*  N  Y  h  neg  LI  neg*  Y  N
Tunisia  h  neg  LO  neg*  N  Y  h  neg  LI  neg*  N  Y
Turkey  h  neg  LO  pos  N  Y  m  pos  LO  pos  Y  N
United Kingdom  p  pos  LI  neg  N  N  m  pos  LO  pos  Y  N
United States  m  pos*  LO  neg*  N  N  h  pos*  LI  neg*  Y  N
Venezuela  h  pos*  L2  pos*  N  Y  h  pos  LI  pos*  Y  Y
Key
Column (1), (7)  p =  poor R 2 (<0.1); m = modest R2 (0.  I-  0.49);h=  high R2 ( 0.5±)
Column (2), (8)  positive or negative; * = statistically significant at 90% confidence level; some 85% levels included
Column (3), (9)  LO  = no lag; LI = one period lag; L2=  two period lag
Column (4), (10)  positive or negative; * = statistically significant at 90% confidence level; some 85% levels included
Column (5), (  11)  Y = yes; N = no
Column (6),(12)  Y =  yes; N = no
Note: V = insitu  value of devcloped reserves; I = development cost pcr unit of reserveAccordingly, the basic equation was run with the reserve price variable lagged one year,
and then with a two year lag. No clear single specification preference emerged between the zero,
one and two year lags.  However the preferred results listed in Table 4-1 leaned towards the
specification without lags.  It appeared in 26 cases, with the remaining 15 split evenly between
one and two period lags for the V-I variable.
Autocorrelation.  As might be expected in dealing with time series data, autocorrelation
in the error terms could arise and did arise in several instances.  If present and left uncorrected,
this  could  bias  parameter  coefficients  and  standard  errors.  Corrections  for  first  order
autocorrelation  were  made  where  Durbin-Watson  statistics  indicated.  Autocorrelation  was
detected in nine countries for the runs summarized in Table 4-1
Signs: Reserve Price Variable.  The expected sign of the reserve price coefficient was
positive: higher reserve prices would encourage reserve additions, other things  equal.  Of the
countries listed in Table 4-1, 18 had negative coefficients for the V-I term.  Of these  18, only
three were statistically significant at the 90 per cent level.  To put it another way: of the 41 sets
of country data, approaching one half had perverse negative signs.  However, of these the null
hypothesis that the coefficient is not significantly different from zero would have been accepted
(or not rejected) in all but three cases.
What is notable is that of the 18 countries with negative V-I coefficients, 11 were OPEC
or Persian Gulf countries, precisely those countries where either a wealth of reserves  or other
factors such as production quotas would weaken any link between putative insitu undeveloped
reserve prices and reserve additions.21 OPEC countries are not price takers in the world market
to  the same  degree  as  non-OPEC  countries.  Hence  the  framework  of  Model  1 is  not  so
applicable.  Also notable is the fact that the four IEA oil producers included in our sample--the
US, UK, Norway and Canada--all have positive V-I coefficients of which two were significant
(Canada and the US).
Of  the  23  country  data  sets  reported  with  positive  coefficients  for  V-I,  nine  or
approaching one half were statistically significant.
Signs: Time Variable.  No a priori expectation attached to the sign of the coefficient of
the time variable.  The supply function could be moving to the left, lowering reserve additions
over time, other things equal.  Or it could be moving to the right, increasing reserve additions
over time.  The former would be indicated by a negative sign, the latter by a positive sign.  And
there could be a mix of effects if sufficient data were available to split the period of analysis--a
procedure attempted for four countries (see later discussion of Model IC).
The positive and negative signs were split almost in half: 20 countries exhibited positive
coefficients,  21  negative  coefficients.  However,  of  the  41  time  coefficients,  only  15 were
statistically significant.  Of these, seven were negative and eight were positive.  Hence, of the 21
21This  finding  is also consistent  with  evidence  of a lack of stable  relationships  between  both futures  and spot prices
and OPEC  production;  see Quan  [1990,  p.87, 127].
32negative coefficients, 14 were not statistically significant from zero.  In other words, for these
countries the null hypothesis that the supply function did not show any distinctive contractionary
or expansionary trend during the period of analysis could not be rejected.  Of the 20 countries
with  positive  time  coefficients,  as  mentioned  eight  were  in  the  category  where  the  null
hypothesis would be rejected.
These results are brought together in Table 4-2.  Only those countries with statistically
significant time trends are listed.  Of the seven with negative coefficients, Abu Dhabi, Libya and
the Neutral Zone can be readily discounted in that for reasons mentioned above the model as
specified may well be flawed.  But of the remaining four, two of those (Trinidad and Tobago and
Tunisia) also have perverse signs for the price coefficient.  Inclusion of Trinidad and Tobago and
Burma in the negative list seems to correspond to the mature degree of development of those
countries.  The  result for the  United  States is  consistent with  earlier analysis  (Bradley and
Watkins [1994] and Adelman [1995]).
Note  that  a  leftward shift  in  the  supply  function  does  not  mean  a  country will  not
continue to add reserves.  For a country already endowed with substantial volumes of proved
reserves, a lot more reserves may await finding and development.  In fact, reserves accruing from
development investment can continue over a long period.  It is just that the returns from further
exploration have started to diminish to a degree that more than offsets continuing technological
improvement, or the opportunity to exploit new plays.  The US lower-48 states onshore may be a
good example of this phenomenon.
The positive list includes one South American country--Brazil--and in Asia, Malaysia and
Brunei-Malaysia  22, again not a surprising result.  Egypt, Syria,  Oman and the Congo represent
countries at relatively early stages of development.  Norway's  status is testimony to the potential
for further offshore activity.  However, both Brazil and Syria have models with perverse price
coefficients.
As seen later, these results are quite robust as to whether Model Type 1 or Model Type 2
is specified.
ModelIB  (MovingAverageData)
This  model  uses three  year moving  averages for  the dependent  variable  and  for the
reserves price independent variable.  As mentioned earlier, the time variable was centered at the
three year moving average.  The salient aspects of the results are summarized in the second panel
of Table 4-1.  Commentary on Model 1A that applies equally to Model 1  B is not repeated here.
Adjustments to the Data.  Years for which negative values were recorded for the insitu
reserve price (V) and for the difference between V and development costs (I) were eliminated, as
22 Data for Malaysia  and Brunei  shown separately  from 1973  onwards. Prior to 1973,  data for these countries  are
combined  as Brunei-Malaysia.
33Table 4-2
Shifts in Supply Functions for Model 1
Evidence of Contraction  Evidence of Expansion
Model 1A  Model 1B  Model 1A  Model 1  B
Number of  21  18  20  24
Countries
of which
Statistically  7  9  8  7
Significant
Coefficients







Abu Dhabi*  Brunei*  Brazil*  Brazil*
Burma  Kuwait  Brunei/Malaysia  Brunei/Malaysia
Libya*  Libya*  Congo  Cameroon
Neutral Zone*  Mexico  Egypt  Congo
Trinidad and Tobago*  Neutral Zone*  Malaysia  Egypt*
Tunisia*  Nigeria*  Norway  Norway
United States  Trinidad and Tobago*  Oman  Venezuela
Tunisia*  Syria*
United States
*countries with perverse reserve price coefficient signs.
34for Model  IA.  Outlier values for the moving average of reserve additions were handled by
inserting dummy variables.
Degree of Model Fit.  Of the 41 country model sets, the great majority (33) had a high
degree of fit (as defined earlier); the remainder (8) had medium fits--there were  no poor fits.
This seemingly favorable outcome is partly influenced by the quite high incidence of dummy
variables accounting for outliers.  They entered the equations for 25 countries of the 41, or some
60 per cent.
Autocorrelation.  This  was  prevalent;  adjustments  were  required  to  28  country
equations, or some 70 per cent of the total.
Lagged Price Relationships.  Given the moving average  data employed,  only  a one
period moving average lag was tested.  It was preferred in just  13 instances or some 30 per cent
of the sample.
Signs:  Reserve Price Variable.  The  expected sign is  positive.  There  was  a  close
correlation between  the  moving average  model results  and  those  for Model  1A.  Contrary
negative signs were recorded  in  18 cases  (of which  many were  OPEC or Middle  East Gulf
countries); four were  statistically significant.  Of the 23 cases with positive  signs, nine were
statistically significant.  In only  six cases  did  the  sign  of the  reserve price variable  switch
between Models IA and lB.
Signs: Time Variable.  Recall that no  expected sign  attaches to  the time  variable--a
positive  sign  indicates an  outward  shift  in  the  supply  function,  a  negative  sign  an  inward
contraction.  The results are reasonably compatible with those for Model 1A, and are shown in
Table 4-2.  The main differences are a somewhat smaller number of  countries with  negative
coefficients  (18  compared  with  21).  However,  more  of  these  are  statistically  significant
(9 compared with 7).  Two OPEC countries (Kuwait and Nigeria) join the list, as do Brunei and
Mexico.  Abu Dhabi and Burma are dropped, compared with Model IA.  However, as for Model
IA most countries (Brunei, Libya, Neutral Zone, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia) in the
negative group have models with perverse price signs.
For countries with significant positive coefficients, compared with Model  IA  Malaysia,
Oman and Syria are dropped; Cameroon and Venezuela are added.  Two countries (Brazil and
Egypt) have perverse price coefficients.  At first glance it might seem that Venezuela--an OPEC
country--might  be  an  unlikely  candidate  in  light  of  strictures  mentioned  above  about  the
applicability of the basic model to this group.  However, Venezuela produces at a rate in relation
to reserves  more commensurate with commercial ratios and hence is less likely to be affected by
any  omitted  variables.23  The  result  is  consistent  with  the  apparent  degree  of  remaining
prospectivity the country enjoys.  But budget constraints have affected the rate of activity in the
past, and may continue to do so.
23 Algeria  is another  OPEC country with a relatively low R/P ratio, but one where the sign of the time variable was
negative, although insignificant.
35Model IC  (Split in Sample Period)
The sample period may mask important shifts in the supply function.  For example, it
may be that there has been a shift between a positive and a negative time relationship.  Or it may
be that the magnitude of the time coefficient was markedly different within the sample period,
although of the same sign.  For example, recent technological changes may have slowed down
the degree to which a supply function would be moving to the left.
To test for shifts in the supply function within the period of analysis four countries were
selected where the time coefficient was statistically significant, where the reserve price variable
had a positive sign, where the degree of fit of the equation was reasonable, and where breaks in
the time series observations did not make testing within a period awkward.
The four countries so selected were:  Egypt, United States, Venezuela, and Mexico.  The
break point selected to bifurcate the two periods for testing was  1977-1978.  Many series run
from 1960 or so to 1994.  The year 1977 thus was a typical midpoint.  But more importantly, it
was  a  year  when  some  of  the  stimulus  that  the  first  oil  price  shock  may  have  had  on
technological development and hence on modifying the supply function could have started to
emerge.
Thus the time period was split between pre  1978 and post  1977.  Separate models were
run  for each period.  Chow tests  were  made to  determine whether  there was evidence  of a
significantly different time coefficients between the two sample periods.  Egypt and the US were
run using Model  IA; the Mexico and Venezuela test relied on the moving average data model,
Model lB.  The results are summarized below:
Null Hypothesis of No  Direction of Apparent
Country  Change in Coefficient  Shift Between Periods
Egypt  not rejected  neg to pos
US  not rejected  neg to pos
Mexico  rejected  pos to neg
Venezuela  not rejected  pos to more pos
Only Mexico showed a statistically significant change in the time coefficient between
periods and this was in the direction of a contraction in the supply function.  If valid, it may well
reflect a combination of dwindling prospectivity for oil in the main offshore producing regions,
inefficiencies  in  Mexican  drilling  operations,  less  reliance  on  advanced  technologies,  and
constraints on the availability of funds for reinvestment.
The other countries may not have statistically significant results but they nevertheless at
least indicate the likely direction of any apparent shift: outwards.  This seeming augmentation of
36the supply function in the latter part of the estimation period is at least directionally consistent
with  the  degree  of  cost  savings  afforded  by  the  recent  surge  in  upstream  technological
improvements--savings that tend to confound warnings about resource depletion.
Model ID  (Inter-relationships Between Price and Technological Changes)
The purpose of Model 1  D is to test the notion that the incentive for technological change
is inversely proportional to the price of oil. Lower prices, or an expectation of lower prices, exert
strong pressure to  reduce costs.  And such cost reductions are most  likely to  be manifest via
improved technology.
An  attempt  was  made  to  detect these  kinds  of  influences  by  respecifying  the  basic
Model 1 in the following way.  The coefficient attaching to the time variable was broken down in
to two components: a non price sensitive coefficient; and a price sensitive coefficient.  Hence we
write the adjusted model as:
RA = a + b(V-I) + (c + dP)t  (4-1)
where P is the field (wellhead) price of oil.  If technology were sensitive to price in the way we
have  suggested, the  expectation  is that  the sign  of the  coefficient  'd'  would  be negative:  a
reduction in price would lead to an outward shift in the supply function.
The same four countries used  for testing  the effect on  the model time coefficients of
splitting the time periods were also used to test specification (4-1) above, namely  Egypt, US,
Mexico, and Venezuela.
The results were as follows.  For the US and Egypt the 'd'  coefficient attaching to the
product term (price x time)  was negative and significant, and the sign and  significance of the
other coefficient which attached simply to the time term did not alter compared with the basic
specification.  For Venezuela, the product term coefficient was also negative and significant, but
the single time term (c in equation (4-1)) switched sign from positive to negative, although now
insignificantly different from zero.  In the case of Mexico, the product term was negative but
insignificant,  as was the  sole  time  term.  Beforehand (Model  1B), the latter term  was  also
negative but significant as well.
Overall the (limited)  results of  the Model  1D specification  supported  the notion that
technological change would be stimulated by lower oil prices.
Results with the Price of Developed Reserves
As discussed in Section 2, the basic equation for Model  1 was redefined with the price
variable set as the price of developed reserves, V, rather than the price of undeveloped reserves,
V-I (see equation (9a), Section 2).  Estimation of the model in this form did not have a great
impact on the results.
37In terms of Model 1A, there were no changes among the categories of degree of fit.  More
countries (4) had perverse negative signs for the price coefficient; one country switched from
negative to positive.  The choice of preferred lags changed for  10 countries, but with no clear
pattern.  The presence or absence of autocorrelation only changed for two countries.
More  importantly,  there  were  no  changes  in  the  critical  signs  attaching  to  the  time
coefficients.  However,  there  were  four  countries  for  which  previously  insignificant  time
coefficients became significant.  These were : Algeria and Brunei ( negative); India and Turkey
(positive).  One country lost significance--Burma (negative).
Much  the  same pattern  of modest  changes were  recorded  for  Model  IB,  employing
moving averages.  However, there were some shifts in the time coefficient, with four countries
changing from  positive to  negative, and two  from negative to positive.  Four countries with
previously insignificant coefficients became significant, three to positive significance (Colombia,
Malaysia  and  India),  one  to  negative  significance  (Abu  Dhabi).  Two  countries  became
insignificant--United States (negative); Norway (positive).
Model  1C tested for differences between time periods,  for the selected four countries.
The results using the V specification showed the US as rejecting the null hypothesis, whereas the
V-I  specification did  not  reject the  hypothesis; the other  countries did  not  change  (Mexico
rejected;  Egypt and  Venezuela not  rejected).  Thus the  earlier finding  of some  evidence of
augmentation of supply functions in the later period was upheld and somewhat strengthened.
In contrast, the results for Model ID - testing for the influence of the level of prices on
shifts in the supply function - were more ambiguous. Whereas before the balance of the evidence
had  been that the  lower prices  had  stimulated cost  reductions,  with  the use  of the price  of
developed reserves, V, as the price variable, no clear pattern emerged.
B.  Results for Model 2  (Non-Linear Model)
Estimation of Model 2 consists of two stages.  First was calculation of the ratios of the
log of (undeveloped) reserve prices (V-I) to reserve additions (RA) by year.  This was designated
'x'  in equation (10) in Section 2, repeated here:
x=In(V-I+  1)/RA
where
RA =  reserve additions
V  =  value of barrel of developed reserves in the ground
I  =  development investment per unit of reserve.
Second was the regression of the 'x'  values on time: xt =  b + ct (see equation (11), Section 2).
The results are summarized in Table 4-3.
38Table 4-3
Summary of Results for Model 2
Adjusted  Sign  of  Auto  Dummy
R 2 Time  Correlation  Variable
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Abu Dhabi  m  pos*  N  Y
Algeria  h  pos*  N  Y
Angola  h  neg  Y  Y
Argentina  h  neg*  N  Y
Australia  h  pos  N  Y
Bahrain  h  pos  N  Y
Bolivia  h  neg  Y  Y
Brazil  h  pos  Y  N
Brunei  h  pos  N  Y
Brunei/Malaysia  h  neg*  N  y
Burma  p  pos  Y  N
Cameroon  h  pos  Y  Y
Canada  h  pos*  N  Y
Colombia  h  neg  Y  Y
Congo  h  neg*  Y  N
Dubai  h  neg  N  Y
Ecuador  h  pos  N  Y
Egypt  h  neg  N  Y
Gabon  h  pos  N  Y
India  h  neg  Y  Y
Indonesia  h  pos  N  Y
Iran  h  pos*  N  Y
Iraq  h  pos  N  Y
Kuwait  h  pos*  N  Y
Libya  h  pos  N  Y
Malaysia  m  neg  N  Y
Mexico  m  pos*  N  Y
Neutral  Zone  h  pos*  N  Y
Nigeria  h  neg  N  Y
Norway  h  neg  Y  Y
Oman  h  neg  N  Y
Peru  h  pos  N  Y
Qatar  h  pos  N  Y
Saudi Arabia  h  neg  N  Y
Syria  h  neg*  N  Y
Trinidad  h  pos*  N  Y
Tunisia  h  pos  N  Y
Turkey  m  pos  Y  Y
United Kingdom  h  neg*  Y  y
United States  h  pos*  Y  Y
Venezuela  h  pos  N  Y
Key
Column (1) p  poor R
2 (<0. 1); m =  modest R2 (0.  - 0.49); h =  high R  ( 0.5+)
Column (2) positive  or negative;  * = statistically significant at 90% confidence  level;
some 85% levels included
Column  (3) Y = yes; N = no
Column  (4) Y = yes; N = no
39Adjustments  to the Data.  Outlier values for  'x'  were handled  by inserting  dummy
variables.  Dummy variables were included for all but three countries.
Degree of  Model Fit.  The great majority of the  countries had  a high  degree  of fit,
namely 35 out of 41.  Of the six remaining countries, one had a poor fit and five had medium fits.
However, to a large degree the high fits can be ascribed to the way the dummy variables picked
up unusual variations in the reserve price to reserve additions ratio.
Lagged  Price  Relationships.  Lagging  the  price  variable  by  two  years  had  little
influence on the results.
Autocorrelation. Corrections for (first order) autocorrelation were made where Durbin-
Watson statistics  indicated.  Adjustments were  required  in  12 cases  of  the total  41,  or  for
approaching 30 per cent of the countries.
Signs:  Time  Variable.  In  the  Model  2  specification  a  positive  value  for the  time
coefficient indicates the supply function  is getting  steeper over time,  that  is, the function  is
rotating in an inward direction.  This is in contrast to Model 1, where a positive time coefficient
indicated an outward  shift  in the  supply function.  Similarly, with  Model 2  a negative time
.coefficient indicates  an  expansionary  phase  (whereas  with  Model  1 a  negative  coefficient
indicated contraction).
The results for the time variable are shown in Table 4-4.  Twenty five countries showed
evidence  of  contraction  of  which  nine  countries  had  a  statistically  significant  coefficient;
16 countries  showed evidence  of expansion,  five significantly  so.  Of the  nine statistically
significant 'contraction'  countries, four were common to either one or both of the corresponding
lists  for  Model  1; the newcomers were  Algeria,  Canada, and  Iran.  Of the  five  statistically
significant 'expansion'  countries, four were common to Model  1; the newcomers were the UK
and Argentina ( see Table 4-2).24
Results with the Price of Developed Reserves
When the estimating  equation relies  on V for the price variable rather  than V-I (see
equation  (lOa), Section 2), little changes.  Three time  coefficients that were  positive become
negative.  One insignificant negative time coefficient becomes significant (Egypt); one country
with a significant positive coefficient becomes insignificant (Mexico).
24 Note that the issue of perverse  price coefficients  which arose in discussing  the results of Table 4-2 for Model I
does not apply to Model  2. The specification  of the first stage  of this model  calculating  the ratio of prices  to reserve
additions  for any year imposes  an upward  sloping  supply  curve.
40Table  4-4
Shifts  in Supply  Functions  for Model  2
Evidence  of Contraction  Evidence  of Expansion
Number of  25  16
Countries
of which
Statistically  9  5
Significant
Coefficients











Kuwait  United Kingdom
Mexico
Neutral  Zone
Trinidad  and Tobago
United States
41In summary, this Section has reported on the results of estimating two models that focus
on the essential factors governing reserve additions.  The fact that the data are far from ideal (see
Section 3) means any results must be treated with caution.
The  first  model  showed  several  countries  had  perverse  relationships  between  the
(imputed) price of undeveloped reserves and reserve additions.  This seemingly indicates model
deficiencies.  But of these countries, several were OPEC members, countries to which the model
is not expected to apply.  The critical variable expressing shifts in supply functions over time was
statistically insignificant in the majority of cases, suggesting no secular change.  Those countries
where it was significant were fairly evenly split between expansionary and contractionary phases.
Results for the second basic model were similar.  The majority of countries showed little
evidence of any systematic shift in the supply function over time.  Where significant shifts were
indicated,  again  the  countries  were  fairly  evenly  divided  between  expansionary  and
contractionary modes.  The results by country for each of the two basic models were reasonably
compatible.
Limited tests for differences within the estimation period displayed some evidence of a
shift in an expansionary direction for the latter part of the period of analysis--roughly from 1980
onwards.  Tests  on  a  restricted  number  of  countries  also  revealed  some  evidence  that
technological innovation and exploratory productivity were stimulated by lower oil prices.
Respecifying  the  price  variable  in  the  model  as  the  price  of  developed  rather  than
undeveloped resources did not alter the tenor of the results.
425.  CONCLUSIONS
Purpose.  Published analyses of the economics of oil producing countries are generally
sparse.  The  reason  is  straightforward--lack of  consistent  and,  often  even very  basic,  data.
Moreover, the deficiencies are not confined to countries lacking strong data collection agencies,
and may be getting worse.  It seems US reserve data will now be published only for alternate
years.
Yet the essence of whether crude oil supply  functions are shifting and  if so, in what
direction is at the crux of any assessment of the outlook for the world oil industry.  Expectations
of more stringent supply, especially in non-OPEC countries, often lie behind the view of those
who foresee a return to OPEC dominance and strong price increases.
This study has attempted to shed light on this issue by estimating supply functions for 41
countries,  using  publicly  available  data.  These  countries  cover  a  wide  range  of  locations
including all the major oil producing regions of the world, except the former Soviet Union.  They
range from  established  oil  producers,  mature  oil producers,  and  more recent  entries  on the
production scene.
Model  Specification.  The  essence  of  the  model  framework  was  to  relate  reserve
additions to the insitu price of discovered but undeveloped reserves, and to the passage of time.
The  latter was  intended  to  measure  the  net  impact  of  changes  in  'prospectivity',  resource
depletion, cost efficiency and technology.  It  enables a distinction to be  made between  shifts
along the supply function and shifts in the position of the supply function--a fundamental aspect
of the research.
Two basic models were specified.  The first (Model Type I) was a straightforward linear
function relating reserve additions to the price of undeveloped resources and to time.  The second
(Model Type 2) estimated the slope of a notional non-linear supply function over time and then
expressed the slope coefficient series as a function of time.
For  a  limited  sample  of  countries,  tests  were  made  of  the  impact  of  splitting  the
estimation period  between earlier and  later  intervals.  The model  was also  modified  to  see
whether there was any evidence that the level of reserve prices themselves would affect shifts in
supply  functions.  Since the  majority of reserve additions  typically  consist  of extensions to
already discovered reserves, the price of developed reserves was also used as the price variable in
the models.
The Data.  Model estimation required an extensive effort to gather and assemble data on
reserves  and  reserve  additions,  production,  drilling  activity,  well  costs,  development
expenditures,  operating  costs,  wellhead  prices and  other elements  for  an  initial  total  of  45
countries over a period of time from the mid 1950s to 1994.  Insurmountable problems for a few
countries led to their deletion from the list, reducing it to 41--still a very considerable number.
43Much of the data gathering for the earlier part of the period of analysis relied on previous
efforts by M.A. Adelman.  In large measure we extended his series forward, and included some
revisions to  old data.  New data was also developed as required.  It became obvious that the
reserve information for  many countries contained a  lot of anomalies.  Adjustments  made to
eliminate these were quite frequent and relied heavily on judgment.
We emphasize our concern about the inadequate coverage and poor quality of some of the
basic data, especially the time series of reserve additions.  It is true that for some countries the
data  reliability  met  good  standards--for  example  the  US  and  Canada.  But  the  degree  of
adjustment  for  other  countries  underlined  poor  collection  procedures  and  even  political
influences on the numbers, such as the booking of reserves.  Moreover, an absence of detail on
the  components  of  reserve  additions  and  corresponding  costs  necessitated  reliance  on  total
reserve additions as a surrogate for potential  reserves--the preferred focus.  And lack of cost
information for individual countries forced reliance on data from other sources such as the US.
In this light, the typically cautionary tenor of researchers'  comments about data problems
and  quality apply with peculiar force here.  The situation  dictated the need for  simplicity in
model specification.  The quality of the data will not support any sophisticated supply modeling
techniques, and few simple ones.  Hence the quite rudimentary nature of the two types of models
we sought to test.
Estimation Results.  The results were broadly similar for the two versions of the simple
models specified.  Several countries showed seemingly perverse effects of higher reserve prices
apparently discouraging rather than encouraging reserve additions.  This was a suitable reminder
that the models specified suffer from the omission of variables needed to adequately explain the
supply behavior of some countries.  Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of those
OPEC countries with very high reserve-production ratios, mainly the Middle Eastern producers.
However, paradoxically the poor results for many OPEC countries are reassuring.  We
would be concerned had a model based on competitive responses with countries acting as price
takers worked well for OPEC producers marching to a different beat.
When the  preferred results  of  all the models  estimated  were combined,  26  countries
displayed  statistically  significant shifts  in  supply  functions.  These were  fairly  evenly  split
between those in an apparent expansionary phase and those suffering contraction.  Some of the
latter were countries with an especially long production history, such as Burma, Trinidad and
Tobago and the US.  Some were OPEC producers--again countries where the model specification
involving price responses is suspect.  Table 5-1 brings together these results.
For any given model run, the critical variable expressing shifts in supply functions over
time  was statistically  insignificant  for the  majority  of  countries.  This  means  that  in  most
instances there is no evidence of a distinctive shift in oil supply functions, either towards more
44constrained  conditions  or  towards  greater  abundance.  The  functions  are  quite  stationary,
notwithstanding reserve depletion.
Table 5-1
Countries with Evidence of Contractionary
or Expansionary Supply Conditions*
Evidence of Contraction  Evidence of Expansion









Neutral Zone  Venezuela
Nigeria  Syria
Trinidad and Tobago  United Kingdom
Tunisia  =-
United States
*  The list is from the combination  of Model I and 2 results  for those countries with statistically  significant  time
coefficients;  see Table 4-2 (Model 1) and Table 4-4 (Model 2).  Six of the Model I countries that were not
confirmed  by Model  2 had perverse  signs for the reserve  price coefficient  (Libya,  Tunisia,  Brunei,  Nigeria,  Brazil,
and Egypt).
Excluding OPEC countries (to which the models do not properly apply), those countries
showing evidence of contraction account for some 80 billion barrels of the world proved  oil
reserves or for about one third of total non-OPEC reserves  25; those countries showing evidence
of expansion account for 40 billion barrels, one half of the "contractionary" total.
Tests  on  a  limited  sample  of  countries  for  differences  within  the  estimation  period
displayed some evidence of a shift in a more expansionary direction for the latter part of the
period  of  analysis--roughly  from  1980  onwards  perhaps  indicating  the  influence  of  new
25 Source: Oil  and Gas  Journal,  date of issue;  the non-OPEC  reserves  include  the FSU.
45technology.  The same limited sample also revealed some evidence that technological innovation,
cost efficiency and exploration productivity were stimulated by lower oil prices.
The tenor of all these results  was not  materially altered when the price of  developed
reserves, rather than  the price of undeveloped reserves, was used in the models.
Implications  for  Oil  Supply.  A  gloomy  outlook  for  non-OPEC  production  is  not
warranted.  Several countries are still in  an underlying expansionary phase.  Others show no
evidence of entering period of decline.  Moreover, there is slight evidence--based on a limited
sample--that contractionary shifts in supply functions may have been mitigated or arrested over
the past 15 years or so.
The same limited sample of countries yielded some evidence that the lower the price of
oil, the greater the stimulus for cost reduction.  If so, recent technological enhancements in the
upstream petroleum sector--albeit not well measured as yet--are no surprise.  It follows that a
sustained period of flat prices may not be associated with a steady deterioration in supply from
non-OPEC countries.
We emphasize again that a leftward shift in the supply function does not mean a country
will  not  continue  to  add  reserves.  In  a  country endowed  with  substantial  proved  reserves,
significantly  more  oil  resources  await  finding  and  development.  Reserves  accruing  from
development investment can continue over a long period, as has happened in the US.  Rather,
what a leftward movement indicates is that the returns from further exploration have started to
diminish, and are not offset by continuing technological or efficiency improvements, or by the
opportunity to exploit new plays.
Generalizations all too often gain currency as precise statements.  Nevertheless, we do
suggest our overall results can be characterized in the following broad way.  Outside of North
America, on balance non-OPEC countries have a rightward (expanding) shifting supply function.
Reserve additions can increase even with constant prices.  North America is probably moving in
the  contrary direction--contracting: less will be found at a given price.  Supply conditions in
OPEC countries  cannot be  depicted by  the interaction of conventional supply functions with
price; other factors intrude.
Further  work.  We believe that significant further progress along the lines of this study
will not  likely emerge  from  simply pursuing  modifications to  the kinds  of models  we have
employed.  Rather, it will have to await improvements in the underlying supply data base.  This
could be assisted by a more intense focus on selected countries.
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48APPENDIX  A
Compendium  of Statistical  Results
49Table Al:  Results for  Model IA
Estimation
Country  Period  C  TIME  V4(i)  RDUM1  RDUM2  RDUM3  RDUM4  AR(l)  Adj. R2  D.W.
Abu Dhabi  65-94  102002.400  -50.615  -96.255  61138.740  0.980  2.285
(-1.372)  (-1.344)  (-1.438)  (37.822)
Algeria  61-94  54576.070  -27.384  29.224  0.056  1.885
(2.007)  (-1.984)  (1.185)
Angola  62-93  -385224.000  193.109  5.702  0.958  0.664  2.032
(-0.287)  (0.291)  (0.538)  (6.335)
Argentina  74-94  -8831.836  4.508  8.849  0.098  1.380
(-1.473)  (1.495)  (1.863)
Australia  73-94  -3404.838  1.807  0.514  -0.093  2.115
(-0.423)  (0.446)  (0.083)
Bahrain  58-94  -96.905  0.063  -1.656  94.296  0.532  1.617
(-0.170)  (0.220)  (-2.524)  (5.538)
Bolivia  74-94  -407.996  0.213  -0.589  113.465  0.883  1.501
(-0.610)  (0.632)  (-1.217)  (12.030)
Brazil  57-94  -26493.190  13.537  -8.129  -17.771  0.434  1.998
(-3.643)  (3.676)  (-1.031)  (-0.105)
Brunei  74-94  1311.421  -0.651  6.504  1144.943  -31.893  -0.131  0.935  1.964
(0.273)  (-0.269)  (1.963)  (7.226)  (-0.470)  (-0.562)
Brunei-Malaysia  56-72  -68254.970  34.689  262.756  0.666  2.395
t-n  (-5.563)  (5.568)  (4.791)
o  Burma  68-94  1167.712  -0.584  -0.134  39.756  0.257  0.787  0.993
(2.107)  (-2.095)  (-0.379)  (8.491)  (0.697)
Cameroon  78-94  -1488.943  0.753  4.675  220.108  0.927  1.912
(-0.590)  (0.596)  (3.120)  (9.982)
Canada  64-88  48040.290  -24.088  69.304  0.509  0.312  1.220
(1.220)  (-1.205)  (2.221)  (2.058)
Colombia  62-94  -4381.889  2.341  -10.978  1,353.414  0.714  1.498
(-0.531)  (0.561)  (-1.466)  (7.099)
Congo  73-94  -6646.223  3.372  0.670  158.288  106.694  0.768  1.947
(-3.677)  (3.704)  (0.436)  (5.808)  (3.955)
Dubai  70-94  7088.512  -3.452  -8.233  1050.074  1469.483  0.811  2.248
(0.750)  (-0.723)  (-1.114)  (5.997)  (8.404)
Ecuador  72-94  18702.690  -9.288  -10.903  0.334  0.091  1.796
(0.942)  (-0.929)  (-0.797)  (1.557)
Egypt  71-94  -33958.080  17.241  11.500  1510.930  -0.468  0.740  1.759
(-3.150)  (3.164)  (1.570)  (6.226)  (-2.246)
Gabon  64-94  3884.997  -1.875  -8.180  367.899  -50.338  624.055  0.559  0.696  2.026
(0.420)  (-0.401)  (-1.110)  (4.273)  (-0.607)  (6.196)  (3.254)
India  70-94  -23965.560  12.195  10.846  1955.720  2013.657  0.729  1.870
(-1.045)  (1.055)  (0.722)  (5.398)  (5.644)
Indonesia  56-94  22217.930  -11.021  8.789  2111.847  798.497  1461.354  185.767  0.453  1.561
(1.382)  (-1.349)  (0.457)  (4.304)  (1.675)  (3.065)  (0.385)Table B1:  Results for Model IA
Estimation
Country  Period  C  TIME  V-I(i)  RDUMI  RDUM2  RDUM3  RDUM4  AR(1)  Adj. R2  D.W.
Iran  56-94  49875.110  -23.961  -107.274  41153.940  0.894  2.314
(0.675)  (-0.638)  (-1.166)  (17.735)
Iraq  58-94  75,773.440  -38.249  205.485  51740.060  0.961  2.055
(1.197)  (-1.189)  (2.860)  (28.976)
Kuwait  56-94  12415.160  -5.719  -41.411  9290.119  9306.300  5922.526  25818.430  0.975  2.047
(0.491)  (-0.445)  (-1.361)  (11.931)  (12.009)  (7.848)  (34.066)
Libya  61-94  53753.710  -26.584  -56.026  9151.281  8460.012  0.952  1.386
(2.643)  (2.579)  (-2.898)  (17.037)  (15.791)
Malaysia  73-94  -47476.800  24.041  6.691  1109.840  1360.185  0.678  1.964
(-2.671)  (2.691)  (0.669)  (4.342)  (5.967)
Mexico  68-94  105846.800  -52.911  83.406  11744.100  14000.430  0.877  2.127
(1.436)  (-1.419)  (1.673)  (8.765)  (10.422)
Neutral  Zone  56-94  60197.050  -30.268  -5.872  -814.926  1843.787  1891.467  1036.125  0.408  2.136
(2.550)  (-2.526)  (-0.216)  (-1.105)  (2.561)  (2.633)  (1.450)
Nigeria  68-94  128210.200  -63.997  -36.875  -327.566  2944.691  0.681  0.805  1.405
(1.193)  (-1.181)  (-0.868)  (-0.410)  (5.208)  (4.494)
Norway  76-90  -60202.030  30.667  18.339  0.157  1.347
(-1.629)  (1.647)  (1.181)
Oman  67-94  -22579.350  11.535  0.977  1911.142  2496.605  0.849  1.765
(-1.914)  (1.937)  (0.105)  (7.585)  (10.038)
Peru  74-94  -472.485  0.252  1.881  202.660  -0.671  0.818  1.766
(-0.514)  (0.544)  (2.465)  (8.945)  (-3.574)
F"  Qatar  56-94  -1748.266  1.027  -13.768  591.259  1498.287  0.769  1.867
(-0.360)  (0.418)  (-2.407)  (3.844)  (9.935)
Saudi  Arabia  56-94  19281.550  -7.881  11.962  60394.950  83092.200  0.957  2.255
(0.170)  (-0.136)  (0.089)  (17.073)  (23.101)
Syria  73-94  -17798.980  9.034  -3.585  670.171  806.744  0.878  2.561
(-2.731)  (2.750)  (-0.841)  (6.827)  (8.352)
Trinidad  71-94  21913.270  -10.968  -7.627  678.340  0.791  1.912
(3.584)  (-3.560)  (-1.621)  (6.085)
Tunisia  67-94  6450.780  -3.212  -4.112  1586.775  0.946  2.196
(1.853)  (-1.824)  (-1.440)  (21.378)
Turkey  63-94  -953.605  0.506  -1.093  216.835  317.558  0.745  1.839
(-0.441)  (0.465)  (-0.555)  (4.530)  (6.695)
UK  76-94  1480.720  -0.382  19.970  -0.075  1.857
(0.030)  (-0.016)  (0.800)
US  59-92  66491.690  -32.594  212.794  0.229  1.394
(2.920)  (-2.820)  (2.610)
Venezuela  58-94  -23452.700  12.524  42.671  30070.050  0.966  1.835
(-0.657)  (0.691)  (1.084)  (30.344)
t-statistics in parenthesisTable  A2:  Results for Model  1B
Esimatlon
Country  Period  C  TIME  MAVJ  MRDUMI  MRDUM2  MRDUM3  MRDUM4  MRDUM5  MRDUM6  AR(1)  Adj.R2  D.W.
Abu Dhabi  65-93  144188.700  -72.182  -13.109  20327.910  20184.940  20271.790  0.550  0.983  1.639
(1.729)  (-1.711)  (-0.187)  (24.738)  (21.841)  (24.542)  (3.097)
Algeria  62-93  36048.520  -18.026  26.750  0.654  0.533  1.420
(1.036)  (-1.025)  (-1.128)  (-4.199)
Angola  64-92  32360.560  -16.387  12.217  25.278  -4.874  1.368  0.831  0.848
(1.128)  (-1.124)  (1.117)  (0.270)  (-0.049)  (7.511)
Argenbna  75-93  -27153.560  13.704  16.297  0.712  0.377  1.344
(-1.441)  (1.448)  (2.561)  (4.316)
Australia  74-93  -2829.068  1.523  0.132  0.570  0.257  1.239
(-0.212)  (0.228)  (0.016)  (2.753)
Bahrain  58-93  -184.403  0.108  -1.866  52.961  41.259  0.544  1.057
(-0.375)  (0.432)  (-3.189)  (3.897)  (3.038)
Bolivia  75-93  -285.885  0.149  0.002  38.762  40.263  38.546  0.507  0.923  1.127
(-0.179)  (0.186)  (0.002)  (7.073)  (5.787)  (7.840)  (1.727)
Brazil  76-93  -37682.450  19.149  -1.598  43.946  0.225  0.709  1.722
(4.179)  (4.227)  (-0.234)  (0.565)  (0.661)
Bnunei  74-93  19303.410  -9.675  -3.179  427.845  0.704  2.028
-2.593  (-2.584)  (-0.581)  (4.526)
Brunei-Malaysia  57-71  -53114.640  27.012  188.633  0.792  1.373
(-7.411)  (7.425)  (5.393)
Burma  69-93  748.529  -0.370  -0.276  0.714  0.396  2.595
-0.723  (-0.710)  (-0.554)  (3.380)
Cameroon  78-93  -13721.280  6.872  15.056  0.821  2.045
(-3.237)  (3.233)  (6.597)
Canada  64-88  -231805.100  -116.640  -107.436  0.294  0.778  1.698
(-0.385)  (0.387)  (3.253)  (6.391)
Colombia  66-93  -36713.390  18.668  -12.568  0.588  0.439  1.330
(-1.434)  (1.449)  (-0.866)  (2.496)
Congo  73-93  -10095.870  5.113  1.994  69.709  0.385  0.523
(-3.591)  (3.617)  (0.717)  (0.681)
Dubai  72-93  3650.751  -1.667  -15.915  769.700  759.213  0.720  1.843
(0.402)  (-0.363)  (-2.201)  (5.217)  (5.077)
Ecuador  73-93  -63498.300  31.947  14.045  139.013  137.576  165.814  107.098  0.810  0.703  1.888
(-0.811)  (0.813)  (0.962)  (2.137)  (1.872)  (2.256)  (1.672)  (5.998)
Egypt  71-93  -71732.730  36.428  -14.114  0.774  1.528
(-8.567)  (8.621)  (-2.153)
Gabon  66-93  13.664  0.120  -15.104  137.140  53.112  0.684  0.652  1.284
(0.001)  (0.025)  (-1.805)  (2.140)  (0.838)  (4.182)
India  70-93  -32278.480  16.427  3.365  595.955  585.864  551.762  945.161  948.162  0.541  1.385
(-1.460)  (1.476)  (0.234)  (1.990)  (1.976)  (1.879)  (3.260)  (3.252)
Indonesia  58-93  -10430.020  5.454  15.213  0.625  0.635  1.320
(-0.536)  (0.554)  (0.892)  (7.842)Table  A2: Results  for Model  1B
Esimation
Country  Period  C  TIME  MAV_I  MRDUMI  MRDUM2  MRDUM3  MRDUM4  MRDUM5 MRDUM6  AR(1)  Adj.R2  D.W.
Iran  59-93  28928.580  -13.112  -183.184  14024.810  13209.480  13363.180  0.606  0.929  2.193
(0.282)  (-0.252)  (-1.812)  (13.148)  (11.029)  (12.414)  (3.982)
Iraq  59-93  71949.280  -36.147  146.369  17626.420  18205.090  17637.870  0.657  0.972  1.677
(0.760)  (-0.753)  (1.663)  (20.834)  (18.987)  (20.562)  (4.398)
Kuwait  57-93  61069.580  -30.164  -58.765  5229.974  8338.473  8262.670  9030.520  0.905  1.553
(2.096)  (-2.037)  (-1.616)  (6.375)  (10.236)  (10.224)  (11.294)
Libya  62-93  95230.490  -47.322  -92.222  5224.285  5368.176  0.810  1.655
(2.582)  (-2.530)  (-2.678)  (6.021)  (6.206)
Malaysia  74-93  -8734.873  4.535  0.750  643.494  398.420  350.646  0.677  2.334
(-0.701)  (0.723)  (0.111)  (4.637)  (3.042)  (2.623)
Mexico  68-93  127599.300  -64.184  223.604  6804.649  6356.302  0.776  1.699
(1.705)  (-1.695)  (3.288)  (4.606)  (4.086)
Neutral  Zone  58-93  54213.780  -27.181  -17.907  183.637  0.561  0.633  1.569
(1.964)  (-1.941)  (-0.632)  (0.573)  (3.567)
Nigeria  69-93  207535.800  -103.453  -159.740  95.495  585.609  581.227  0.549  0.818  0.810
(2.644)  (-2.616)  (-3.059)  (0.159)  (0.864)  (0.968)  (4.121)
Norway  81-93  -354236.200  178.576  106.795  -0.175  0.707  2.215
(-4.051)  (4.062)  (3.143)  (-0.649)
Oman  69-93  -26579.160  13.545  1.937  0.574  0.521  2.299
w-n  (-0.891)  (0.904)  (0.095)  (4.070)
Peru  74-93  258.524  -0.123  5.394  -11.692  44.094  0.708  1.854
(0.185)  (-0.174)  (4.674)  (-0.617)  (2.179)
Qatar  58-93  6102.229  -2.918  -15.530  237.470  0.662  0.664  1.494
(0.536)  (-0.505)  (-1.462)  (2.436)  (4.712)
Saudi  Arabia  57-93  44195.300  -20.766  93.863  22285.020  19566.340  20789.580  26895.780 27860.890 28198.270  0.959  0.927
(0.578)  (-0.534)  (1.093)  (11.552)  (10.128)  (10.759)  (13.557)  (13.978)  (14.089)
Syria  75-93  -73706.750  37.173  -2.172  0.793  0.448  1.727
(-0.699)  (0.703)  (-0.153)  (3.180)
Trinidad  73-93  8827.689  -4.405  -0.533  0.318  0.723  1.610
(2.111)  (-2.094)  (-0.184)  (3.727)
Tunisia  68-93  11675.400  -5.842  -1.966  -36.989  -77.663  458.077  440.816  0.555  2.042
(1.701)  (-1.682)  (-0.363)  (-0.293)  (-0.646)  (3.824)  (3.670)
Turkey  64-93  -2317.924  1.177  2.744  0.870  0.812  1.664
(-0.173)  (0.175)  (0.811)  (8.518)
UK  76-93  -70057.210  35.531  31.930  0.352  0.459  2.425
(-1.350)  (1.363)  (1.124)  (3.820)
US  76-93  111162.000  -55.286  251.842  0.506  0.589  1.384
(2.581)  (-2.527)  (2.422)  (2.751)
Venezuela  59-93  -78282.750  40.198  57.373  -1338.595  8868.218  9657.995  10137.220  0.597  0.980  1.596
(-1.691)  (1.717)  (1.376)  (-3.094)  (17.701)  (19.186)  (23.055)  (3.585)
t-statistics  in parenthesisTable  A3: Results  tor Model 2
Period  C  TIME  ADUMI  ADUM2  ADUM3  AR(1)  Adj.R2  D.W.
Abu Dhabi  63-94  -0.185  0.000  0.010  0.421  1.656
(-2.119)  (2.151)  (4.253)
Algeria  61-94  -0.591  0.000  0.144  0.091  0.975  1.907
(-3.594)  (3.624)  (30.307)  (18.836)
Angola  62-93  0.392  0.000  0.081  0.625  0.637  1.621
(0.290)  (-0.278)  (7.106)  (4.276)
Argentna  74-94  0.780  -0.000  0.171  0.176  0.992  1.885
(2.321)  (-2.289)  (35.456)  (36.550)
Australia  73-94  -0.556  0.000  0.224  0.901  2.127
(-0.531)  (0.547)  (13.910)
Bahrain  58-94  -43.127  0.022  10.319  2.705  0.585  2.061
(-0.963)  (0.976)  (6.999)  (1.813)
Bolivia  74-94  26.239  -0.010  0.853  0.649  0.657  1.395
(0.904)  (-0.897)  (7.776)  (3.465)
Brazil  57-94  -0.087  0.000  0.205  0.480  1.646
(-0.181)  (0.200)  (4.513)
Brunei  73-94  -0.930  0.001  1.318  0.906  1.602
(-0.154)  (0.164)  (14.229)
Brunei-Malays 56-72  2.312  -0.001  0.007  0.464  1.923
(3.828)  (-3.810)  (1.153)
Burma  68-94  -7.946  0.004  0.077  -0.032  1.426
(-0.794)  (0.815)  (0.620)
Cameroon  78-94  -1.047  0.001  0.138  0.463  0.625  1.534
(-0.176)  (0.184)  (3.809)  (1.525)
Canada  64-88  -0.165  0.000  -0.001  0.103  1.232
(-2.011)  (2.044)  (-0.415)
Colombia  62-94  0.178  -0.000  0.534  0.582  0.963  2.150
(0.083)  (-0.074)  (29.287)  (3.136)
Congo  73-94  12.558  -0.006  -0.199  0.554  0.865
(6.371)  (-6.339)  (-1.527)
Dubai  70-94  1.983  -0.001  3.132  0.998  1.427
(1.294)  (-1.281)  (110.144)
Ecuador  72-94  -0.665  0.000  0.553  0.602  2.181
(-0.116)  (0.126)  (5.904)
Egypt  71-94  1.229  -0.001  0.212  0.907  2.121
(1.504)  (-1.487)  (14.846)
Gabon  64-94  -0.203  0.000  1.243  0.981  1.843
(-0.163)  (0.182)  (39.075)
India  70-94  0.715  -0.000  0.038  0.432  0.581  1.646
(0.646)  (-0.637)  (4.303)  (1.615)
Indonesia  56-94  -0.655  0.000  1.248  0.989  1.942
(-1.099)  (1.113)  (58.124)Table A3: Results for Model 2
Period  C  TIME  ADUMI  ADUM2  ADUM3  AR(1)  Adj.R2  D.W.
Iran  56-94  -0.067  0.000  0.031  0.025  0.026  0.970  1.513
(-1.840)  (1.881)  (23.585)  (18.900)  -19.446
Iraq  56-94  -0.364  0.000  0.143  0.883  2.259
(-1.558)  (1.581)  (17.021)
Kuwait  56-94  -1.224  0.001  0.321  0.803  2.201
(-1.688)  (1.700)  (12.289)
Libya  61-94  -0.439  0.000  0.086  0.092  0.755  1.692
(-1.045)  (1.061)  (7.018)  (7.487)
Malaysia  73-94  0.955  -0.000  0.019  0.231  2.326
(1.549)  (-1.531)  (1.967)
Mexico  68-94  -0.123  0.000  0.004  0.003  0.417  1.412
(-1.886)  (1.910)  (3.313)  (2.472)
Neutral  Zone  56-94  -2.915  0.001  1.299  0.969  1.744
(-2.750)  (2.770)  (33.986)
Nigeria  68-94  0.036  -0.000  0.067  0.509  1.872
(0.061)  (-0.049)  (5.369)
Norway  76-88  1.0328  -0.001  0.002  0.694  0.795  2.856
(1.324)  (-1.323)  (2.351)  (4.004)
Oman  67-94  0.775  -0.000  0.356  0.906  1.371
(0.775)  (-0.761)  (16.181)
1-n  Peru  74-94  -3.285  0.002  0.898  0.738  2.211
(-0.400)  (0.409)  (7.639)
Qatar  56-94  -0.717  0.000  1.148  0.954  1.945
(-0.624)  (0.642)  (27.717)
Saudi  Arabia  56-94  0.008  -0.000  0.024  0.954  2.203
(0.334)  (-0.302)  (28.147)
Syria  73-94  5.942  -0.003  1.015  0.944  1.746
(1.667)  (-1.653)  (18.544)
Trinidad  71-94  -2.359  0.001  0.077  0.541  1.693
(-2.392)  (2.419)  (4.453)
Tunisia  67-94  -2.700  0.001  1.046  0.885  0.956  2.170
(-1.062)  (1.082)  (18.746)  (15.874)
Turkey  63-94  -2.606  0.001  0.150  0.556  0.413  2.315
(-0.495)  (0.507)  (3.197)  (2.952)
UK  76-94  0.255  0.000  0.118  0.369  0.999  1.873
(1.645)  (-1.629)  (119.295)  (1.621)
US  60-92  0.00  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.883  0.849  1.049
(-0.191)  (0.201)  (5.885)  (9.736)  (4.996)
Venezuela  56-94  -0.052  0.003  0.035  0.946  1.651
(-1.298)  (1.329)  (24.639)
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